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The Department of State

bulletin

XIV, No. 76

March 18, 1953



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March 16, 1953

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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U.S. and U.K. Discuss Economic Problems, Political Developments

COMMUNIQUE ON ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS

Press release 132 dated March 7

Representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom today concluded their discussions on measures for creating the economic and financial conditions under which the countries of the free world may be better able to earn their own living by their own industry. These conversations were informal and raised questions on which it was understood in advance that no commitments would be made.

The U.K. representatives explained the suggestions which emerged from the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, held in London in December of last year,¹ for measures which might be taken to restore balance in the world economy through the channels of commerce and to develop, by progressive stages, an effective multilateral trade and payments system over the widest possible area. These measures would involve action by the Commonwealth countries, the United States, the countries of continental Western Europe, and the countries that are members of existing international trade and financial institutions.

The discussions covered the internal and international conditions which would have to be established in order that each country might enjoy the human and material benefits of freer and dependable currencies and a larger volume of trade and commerce.

They also included a review of the over-all economic and fiscal situation of the United States. Note was taken of the significant U.S. defense expenditures overseas, including offshore purchases.

From these conversations, certain conclusions have emerged:

There is full agreement between the two Governments that the solution of the economic problems of the free world is vital to its security and well-being.

They also agree that the essential elements of

a workable and productive economic system within the free world should include

(a) *Sound internal policies:* International economic policies cannot succeed unless they are based on sound internal policies, by debtor as well as creditor countries. During the course of the conversations, the U.S. representatives made it clear that the Government of the United States welcomes the intention of the Commonwealth Governments, expressed in their December communique, to follow the internal financial and economic policies needed to achieve a freer exchange of currencies and trade.

(b) *Freer trade and currencies:* The freeing and expansion of world trade must cover currencies as well as trade. On the financial side the objective should be the eventual convertibility of sterling and other currencies and the gradual removal of restrictions on payments. On the trade side the objective should be to bring about the relaxation of trade restrictions and discriminations in a way which, in the words of President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message, "will recognize the importance of profitable and equitable world trade."² It is in the interest of the United States to take such measures as are exemplified in the President's message in order that the members of the free world may the better pay their way by their own efforts.

(c) *Development:* The creation of conditions, both by creditor and by debtor countries, which will foster international investment and the sound development of the resources of the free world. In this connection, the Government of the United States emphasized its intention to encourage the flow of investment abroad.

(d) *Organization:* International institutions should be constructively used to promote these policies.

The Government of the United States welcomes the initiative taken by the United Kingdom Government in connection with these problems of common concern.

The two Governments believe that there is

¹ For text of communique issued at the conclusion of this Conference, see p. 408.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 208.

reason to hope for continued progress toward a better balanced, growing world trade and toward the restoration of a multilateral system of trade and payments. The nature and scope of the measures which may be taken by governments to further such progress, and the timing of such measures, will require further study.

The Government of the United States will undertake, and continue over the next several months, an intensive examination and review of the general subjects discussed at the present meetings, including the suggestions resulting from the Commonwealth Economic Conference, and possible alternative suggestions, in order to arrive at a sound judgment with respect to the specific courses of action which might be taken. The two Governments intend to have further discussions with each other, with other governments, and with the international organizations concerned, including the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

The representatives of the two Governments participating in the discussions were as follows:

For the United Kingdom:

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
R. A. Butler, Chancellor of the Exchequer
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador to the United States
Sir Pierson Dixon, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
Sir Leslie Rowan, Second Secretary, Treasury
Sir Edwin Plowden, Chief Planning Officer, Treasury
Sir Frank Lee, Permanent Secretary, Board of Trade
D. H. F. Rickett, Economic Minister, British Embassy, Washington, D. C.

For the United States:

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
Lewis W. Douglas, Alternate for the Secretary of State
George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury
Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security
Winthrop W. Aldrich, American Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Randolph Burgess, Deputy to the Secretary of the Treasury
Harold Linder, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Richard M. Bissell, Consultant to the Director for Mutual Security
Andrew N. Overby, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Gabriel Hauge, Special Assistant to the President

COMMUNIQUE ON POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS

Press release 131 dated March 7

In addition to the discussions on economic and financial problems, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, and Secretary of State Dulles discussed the international political developments that have taken place since their conversations in London early in February.

1. They exchanged views regarding developments in the Soviet Union.

2. With respect to Europe, particular attention was given to the subject of the proposed treaty

for a European Defense Community. Both the United States and United Kingdom Governments are concerned that the treaty be ratified as speedily as possible, so as to provide further continental unity which is essential to the most effective operation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

3. They also considered the situation in the Middle East with particular reference to the major problems in the area, and were in agreement on the urgency of furthering constructive solutions in the interest of all concerned.

4. With respect to Iran, Mr. Eden said that Her Majesty's Government were decided to stand on the proposals presented to Prime Minister Mossadegh on February 20, 1953. These proposals were the result of many conversations and careful study of all the factors involved. In the opinion of the United States Government these proposals are reasonable and fair. If agreed to:

(a) Iran would retain control of its own oil industry and of its own oil policies.

(b) The problem of compensation would be disposed of in such a way that there would be no sacrifice of the principles which form the very basis of international intercourse among free nations, and the payment of compensation would be fully compatible with the rehabilitation of Iran's economy.

(c) Iran would have full opportunity to enter into arrangements whereby it could sell its oil in substantial quantities at competitive commercial prices in world markets.

(d) There would be placed at Iran's disposal sufficient funds, to be repaid in oil, to meet its immediate financial problems pending resumption of the flow of revenue from its oil industry.

5. The two Secretaries of State also considered the Far Eastern situation. They reaffirmed the importance of preventing the shipment of strategic materials to the mainland of China. Mr. Eden stated that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in addition to the system of controls already in force, had decided:

(a) To introduce a new system of licensing vessels registered in the United Kingdom and colonies so that strategic materials from non-British sources could not be carried to China in British ships;

(b) To take additional steps designed to ensure that no ships of the Soviet bloc or other nationality carrying strategic cargoes to China should be bunkered in a British port.

The United States and British Governments will concert their efforts to secure the cooperation of other maritime and trading nations in the measures designed to exclude the shipment of strategic materials to the mainland of China.

6. Under arrangements made for the common defense the United States has the use of certain

bases in the United Kingdom. The prior understanding was confirmed that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

Commonwealth Economic Conference Communique

The following communique was issued at London on December 11, 1952, at the conclusion of the Commonwealth Economic Conference:

1. The Commonwealth Economic Conference which ended today was convened with the aim of concerting measures for increasing the economic strength of the Commonwealth countries, including the Colonial Territories, and creating conditions in which their peoples can play their part in securing prosperity and contentment for themselves and for the world.

2. In recent years the Sterling Area has been faced with recurrent economic crises which have forced its members to take emergency measures of trade and exchange restriction. These measures were necessary but they have inevitably tended to frustrate long-term economic expansion on which our hopes and opportunities for the future are founded. This was recognised at the January meeting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers. Measures taken in accordance with the conclusions of that meeting have, however, enabled the present Conference to decide that a more positive policy can now be adopted, both by the Commonwealth countries themselves and in concert with other friendly countries, to promote expansion of world production and trade.

3. The Conference agreed that the Commonwealth countries would work together to achieve certain broad common objectives. They have no intention of seeking the creation of a discriminatory economic bloc, rather their object is by strengthening themselves to benefit the world economy generally.

Accordingly, the following principles were agreed upon as governing the approach to a whole range of subjects under discussion:

(a) Internal economic policies designed to curb inflation and rises in the cost of living should be steadily followed.

(b) Sound economic development should be encouraged with the object of increasing productive strength and competitive power, providing employment and raising standards of life.

(c) A multilateral trade and payment system should be extended over the widest possible area.

4. Application of these principles will require individual action by the Commonwealth Governments, cooperation among them and international action with other trading nations and existing international organisations.

Internal Measures

5. All Commonwealth Governments have agreed to persevere in their efforts to curb inflation. Inflationary conditions frustrate the progress of sound development both by increasing its cost and by destroying savings necessary to finance it. Moreover, they damage the external balance by stimulating excessive imports and by diverting to internal use goods which would otherwise be available for export.

6. An adequate and stable external balance must be a first objective for all Governments. Failure to achieve this means repeated crises, a continuously rising cost of living, a constant threat to employment and failure to develop resources effectively. The Conference welcomed the improvement which had taken place in the balance of payments both of the individual Sterling Area countries and of the Sterling Area as a whole, following upon the conclusions reached by the Commonwealth Finance Ministers at their meeting in January, 1952. It noted with satisfaction that the Sterling Area would achieve balance with the rest of the world in the second half of this year. It was agreed, however, that the achievement, while reassuring, was only the first step towards a stable balance for the Sterling Area. Policies were agreed upon for 1953 which it is hoped will lead to further improvement in reserves during that year. Nevertheless, while there has been steady improvement, the level of reserves is as yet too low to warrant any substantial relaxation of restrictions on imports from outside the Sterling Area.

7. The Conference considered the extensive restrictions which some countries of the sterling Commonwealth have needed to impose upon imports from the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth sources. There was agreement that restrictions imposed because of the balance of payments problems should be relaxed as the external financial position of the countries improved. In considering the whole problem the Governments concerned would have clearly in mind the difficulties which restrictions have raised for export industries affected.

8. The economic and social objectives of the Commonwealth countries, individually and in association, depend upon their ability to produce and supply under competitive conditions and expanding flow of exports. There was, therefore, general agreement in the Conference on the vital need to expand the earning power of all the Sterling countries.

Development Policy

9. Throughout the Commonwealth there is wide scope for expanding production of essential supplies which the whole world needs—food and agricultural products, minerals and engineering products—and improving the means for trans-

porting them. This development of the basic essentials has on occasion been impeded by other development of a less sound and permanent kind, which has overtaxed the countries' resources and has failed to contribute to the building of economic strength. The Conference agreed that in the Sterling Area countries development should be concentrated on projects which directly or indirectly contribute to the improvement of the area's balance of payments with the rest of the world. Such projects should strengthen the economy of the countries concerned and increase their competitive power in world markets and so, by improving their balance of payments, bring increasing prosperity to their peoples. In some countries of the area, however, development plans have been or are being made to provide for some basic improvement in standards of living which is a necessary foundation for further economic development. Some social investment is also urgently needed in the more developed countries, certain of which have rapidly increasing populations. The Conference recognized the need in such cases for these types of investment.

10. To enable development to go forward, a sufficient flow of savings must be provided in the countries undertaking the development and also in other countries which are ready to invest their savings there. The amount of savings which will be available from external sources will at best be small in relation to the size of the development programmes of countries of the Sterling Commonwealth and it is therefore essential that these countries should themselves adopt policies which increase the flow of savings. Although this is inevitably a slow process for countries with low incomes and little margin above the basic needs for existence, the process of development will itself increase income and increase the flow of savings.

11. The United Kingdom is the traditional source of external capital for Commonwealth investment and has special responsibilities in the Colonial territories. The United Kingdom Government are determined that the flow of capital from London for sound development throughout the Commonwealth shall be maintained and increased. This will only be possible if the United Kingdom can sustain the necessary level of internal savings and can achieve a surplus on overseas account additional to that required to meet its heavy existing commitments.

12. The United Kingdom Government have however undertaken to make a special effort to provide additional capital for Commonwealth development by facilitating the financing of schemes in other Commonwealth countries which will contribute to the improvement of the Sterling area's balance of payments. The Conference took note that the United Kingdom Government would wish before making any of this additional finance available for Commonwealth development

to be sure that the country concerned was itself devoting an adequate part of its resources to investment designed to improve the Sterling area's balance of payments, and was ready to make a sufficient contribution towards the particular scheme in question to ensure that both countries had an interest in seeing that it was carried through as efficiently and economically as possible.

13. The Conference welcomed the proposal by a group of important financial, industrial and commercial concerns in the United Kingdom to form a company to further development in other countries of the Commonwealth and the colonial empire. It was pleased to note that an announcement by this group is being issued today. The Conference also welcomed a statement by the United Kingdom representatives that the United Kingdom Government intend to discuss with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development arrangements to give effect to their decision to make sterling available for lending by the Bank, for projects designed to improve the sterling area's balance of payments.¹

14. The Conference recognised the important contribution which investors outside the sterling area, particularly in the United States, can make to economic development in the sterling area and agreed that every effort should be made to create conditions which would encourage such investment. It further agreed that all sterling area Governments should strive to attain this by reducing such obstacles as controls over the movements of capital across the exchanges. The United Kingdom Government have reviewed the right which is now enjoyed by residents outside the sterling area who have invested capital in approved projects in the United Kingdom and colonial empire since 1st January 1950 to transfer their capital across the exchanges. At present this right only extends to the sterling equivalent of the initial investment. The United Kingdom Government informed the Conference that they have decided that henceforth it shall extend also to capital profits.

15. *Commodity policy.* The Conference recognised that there was no one universal remedy for the problem of instability of prices for primary commodities. Each commodity must be considered on its merits in the light of the conditions prevailing at the time, and the circumstances must determine what form of arrangements would be appropriate. The Conference agreed that violent fluctuations and an uneconomic level of prices for primary commodities were against the interest of consumers as well as producers. All Commonwealth Governments are therefore ready to co-operate in considering, commodity by commodity, international schemes designed to ensure stability of demand and prices at an economic level. They

¹ For text of the International Bank's announcement relating to these arrangements, see BULLETIN of Feb. 16, 1953, p. 264.

also recognise the need for an agreed procedure for calling together the Governments concerned to consider emergency action in the event of rapidly developing conditions of surplus or shortage of commodities entering into international trade.

16. There was general recognition at the Conference of the value of existing preferences. On the initiative of the United Kingdom a discussion took place on a proposal that all Commonwealth countries should join in seeking release from the "No new preference" rule in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G. A. T. T.), and this United Kingdom proposal was supported by the representatives of some countries. The representatives of other countries felt that such an approach would not advance the agreed objective of restoring multilateral world trade and the Conference was therefore unable to support it. All Commonwealth Governments agreed, however, to co-operate with the United Kingdom Government in an approach to the other contracting parties to the G. A. T. T. to meet particular difficulties arising on the United Kingdom tariff. The object would be to enable the United Kingdom, consistently with the basic provisions of the G.A.T.T., to continue the duty-free entry for Commonwealth goods notwithstanding any increases that might from time to time become necessary in duties designed to protect domestic industry and agriculture in the United Kingdom. The Commonwealth Governments also agreed to consider sympathetically certain special tariff problems affecting the Colonies.

International Action.

17. Resolute action in accordance with the conclusions recorded above will in itself do much to strengthen the economies of the sterling Commonwealth countries, but this is not enough. Action in a wider sphere is also necessary. The Conference therefore agreed to seek the co-operation of other countries in a plan to create the conditions for expanding world production and trade. The aim is to secure international agreement on the adoption of policies by creditor and debtor countries which will restore balance in the world economy on the lines of "Trade not aid" and will by progressive stages and within reasonable time, create an effective multilateral trade and payments system covering the widest possible area.

18. *Trade.* The plan envisages positive international action for the progressive removal, as circumstances permit, of import restrictions imposed for the purpose of bringing a country's external accounts into balance. Action will be required by both creditor and debtor countries. The rate of progress in removing discrimination will depend upon the advance towards equilibrium between the United States and the rest of the world.

19. The sterling Commonwealth countries will not all be able to remove restrictions at the same time. In particular the representatives of some countries have emphasised that they must continue to use their exchange resources in the manner which enables them to carry out their planned development programmes most effectively, and that they are likely to continue to need import restrictions for this purpose.

20. *Finance.* The Conference agreed that it is important not only for the United Kingdom and the sterling area but also for the world that sterling should resume its full role as a medium of world trade and exchange. An integral part of any effective multilateral system is the restoration of the convertibility of sterling but it can only be reached by progressive stages. The achievement of convertibility will depend fundamentally upon three conditions:

- (a) the continuing success of the action by sterling Commonwealth countries themselves, as outlined above;
- (b) the prospect that trading nations will adopt trade policies which are conducive to the expansion of world trade, and
- (c) the availability of adequate financial support through the International Monetary Fund or otherwise.

Procedure.

21. It is proposed to seek acceptance of this plan by the Governments of the United States and of European countries whose co-operation is essential, and to work as far as possible through existing international institutions dealing with finance and trade.

22. The timing of the successive stages of this plan cannot be decided at present. This can only be judged as the necessary conditions are satisfactorily fulfilled.

Conclusion.

23. The Conference is happy to be able to present this account of the confident understanding which exists between members of the Commonwealth, and the wide measure of agreement which they have been able to achieve over the whole range of economic policy. The aims of their co-operation are entirely consistent with their close ties with the United States and the members of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. The Commonwealth countries look outward to similar co-operation with other countries, not inward to a closed association. It is their common purpose by their own efforts and together with others to increase world trade for the mutual benefit of all peoples.

U.S. Representatives To Attend Queen Elizabeth's Coronation

White House press release dated March 6

The President has designated the following to attend the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II on June 2, 1953, as his representatives:

George Catlett Marshall, former Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army during World War II, has been named as the President's special representative

Earl Warren, Governor of California, assistant representative

Mrs. Gardner Cowles, of Cowles Publications, assistant representative

Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to represent the three U.S. Services

The President named the representatives at the invitation of Queen Elizabeth II. At the coronation ceremony in Westminster Abbey they will be seated with the special representatives of other governments.

Netherlands Foreign Minister Visits Washington

Press release 125 dated March 4

The Netherlands Foreign Minister, J. M. A. H. Luns, visited Washington on March 10 and 11. During his visit to Washington he met with Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Smith for an exchange of views. Mr. Luns arrived in the United States on March 2 to attend the U.N. General Assembly meeting and is planning to return to the Netherlands on March 13.

Messages Relating to Illness and Death of Joseph Stalin

Message to the Russian People

Statement by the President

White House press release dated March 4

At this moment in history when multitudes of Russians are anxiously concerned because of the illness of the Soviet ruler the thoughts of America go out to all the people of the U.S.S.R.—the men and women, the boys and girls—in the villages, cities, farms, and factories of their homeland.

They are the children of the same God who is the Father of all peoples everywhere. And like all peoples, Russia's millions share our longing for a friendly and peaceful world.

Regardless of the identity of government per-

sonalities, the prayer of us Americans continues to be that the Almighty will watch over the people of that vast country and bring them, in His wisdom, opportunity to live their lives in a world where all men, women, and children dwell in peace and comradeship.

Message of Official Condolences

White House press release dated March 5

The President requested the Secretary of State to send the following message to the American Embassy at Moscow for transmission to the Soviet Foreign Office by Jacob E. Beam, Chargé d'Affaires of the American Embassy:

The Government of the United States tenders its official condolences to the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the death of Generalissimo Joseph Stalin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union.

Council of Free Czechoslovakia Receives U.S. Messages of Hope

Following are the texts of messages sent by President Eisenhower and by Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Smith to the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. The messages were read on February 22 at New York on the occasion of the opening of a New York headquarters for the Council.

Message From President Eisenhower

For 5 years your country has been terrorized by alien misrule. Communist tyranny has sought to destroy the values of Christianity and Western civilization on which the national traditions of the people of Czechoslovakia are based. Equitable material rewards for their labor have been denied them and their standard of living has sharply declined as a result of Soviet plundering.

The United States has always stood and stands now for the freedom of nations from oppression. The American people have never been indifferent to suffering humanity anywhere. Your people, though now enslaved, may be assured that America remains true to its great traditions, and firm in its conviction that tyranny cannot long endure in a world where free men are strong, united, and resolute.

Joint Message From Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Smith

You are meeting now to honor the democracy which was destroyed 5 years ago and to express again the world's condemnation of that act and the means by which it was brought about. The Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia and developments in your country since that time have laid bare again the true nature of Soviet imperialism. These events have made clear once

more that one country, however much the great majority may cherish the preservation of national independence, cannot in isolation retain freedom in the face of an aggressive and ruthless totalitarianism.

Today that totalitarianism is engaged in a hate and falsification campaign of vast proportions. In Czechoslovakia it seeks to extinguish the love of liberty among the Czechs and Slovaks, their friendship for the United States, and the common civilization which binds them to the West.

The regime devotes itself to poisoning the international atmosphere upon the requirement of its foreign masters. Internally the judicial murders, the concentration camps, the naked exploitation of workers and farmers, the oppression of religion, and the inflaming of group prejudices are manifestations of alien rule over Czechoslovakia today.

The present ordeal of the Czech people cannot be permanent. A regime so incompatible with the right of nations to be free contains elements of weakness which must eventually destroy it.

So long as the historic antipathy of your people to foreign domination continues and the national traditions are kept alive by those abroad and by the silent millions at home, there is sustaining hope that the Czechs and Slovaks will once again take their rightful place as a constructive force in the community of free peoples.

Of this we are confident as we move forward in the task of adding to the strength and solidarity of the free world.

Deadline For Filing Claims For German Public Service Pensions

Press release 120 dated March 3

The Department of State wishes to remind residents of the United States who were formerly in the German public service and who are eligible claimants under the "Law Concerning the Redress of National Socialist Wrongs to Former Employees of the Public Service Residing Abroad" that they must submit their applications for redress before March 31, 1953.

As stated in the Department's previous announcement on this subject,¹ this law gives legal recognition to claims for pension payments by former employees of the German public service now residing outside Germany and establishes the machinery under which such claims may be entered and satisfied. In brief, it provides that former employees of the German public service, with legal or permanent residence abroad predating May 23, 1949, may file their claims for pensions with representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany in the country of residence. In view of the imminent deadline, claimants are urged to file their claims without delay with the German

consulates general and German consulates at any of the following addresses:

German Consulate General, 745 Fifth Ave., New York 22, N.Y.

German Consulate General, 703 Market St., San Francisco 3, Calif.

German Consulate General, 8 South Michigan Ave., Chicago 3, Ill.

German Consulate, 1026 Hurt Bldg., Atlanta, Ga.

German Consulate, 2711 Book Bldg., Washington Blvd., Detroit 26, Mich.

German Consulate, Bryant Bldg., 1102 Grand Ave., Kansas City 6, Mo.

German Consulate, 3450 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles 5, Calif.

German Consulate, International Trade Mart, New Orleans 12, La.

German Consulate, 905 Securities Bldg., 3d and Stuart Sts., Seattle 1, Wash.

The "Law Concerning the Redress of National Socialist Wrongs to Former Employees Residing Abroad" makes provision for payment of benefits into blocked bank accounts in the Federal Republic of Germany. A recent administrative order issued by the Ministry of Economics of the Federal Republic of Germany, however, specifically provides for the transfer of pension payments to qualified claimants residing abroad. Pursuant to this order, it is no longer necessary in approved claims to make payments into blocked deutsche-mark accounts. Under the present order when the transfer has been approved, payments may be made to a German foreign trade bank or postal agency for direct remittance to the claimant residing abroad. Residents of the United States may wish to inquire of the German consulates and consulates general the procedure to be followed in effecting the transfer of their pension payments to this country.

International Bank To Send Study Mission to Germany

A mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will arrive in Bonn, Germany, on March 19, 1953, it was announced on March 5. The mission is visiting the Federal Republic of Germany, in response to an invitation from the Government, to study the general economic situation and Germany's investment plans.

S. R. Cope, Assistant Director of the Department of Operations for Europe, Africa, and Australasia, will head the group; the other members are Benjamin B. King and Badri Rao, of the same Department.

This is the Bank's first mission to Germany. The mission will start its discussions with Government officials in Bonn. At a later stage it will visit other important centers to obtain at first-hand an appreciation of the situation in the main sectors of the economy. The mission will be in Germany for about 5 weeks.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 16, 1953, p. 262.

An Expression of Faith in the United Nations

Remarks by Secretary Dulles¹

Press release 116 dated March 2

Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to be with you here tonight because I fully agree with what you have just said; namely, that any efforts which I may make in the field of international relations will be almost sure to fail unless I can have the support of those who are represented by the organizations here tonight.

Under our form of society foreign policy is not a matter just for diplomats, however astute they may be. Foreign policies to be successful must be understood and supported by the people. And I have stated that it will be my purpose, as far as it is possible, to see to it that our foreign policies are simple, so that they can be understood; that they are made public, so that people will have a chance to understand them; and they will, as far as possible, conform to the moral standards which I know are held by the great bulk of our people, so that they will, I hope, deserve their support.

I told your director some 3 months ago, I think, that if it were at all possible I would meet with you here tonight. I told him I could not come with any formally prepared address, but that I would hope by the very fact of my presence here with you to bear witness to the great faith which I have in the United Nations, and my hope that you will carry on your own efforts to support it and to bring about a better understanding of it by the American people. That is probably the most that I can do by being here tonight.

I do have a few thoughts which I would express inadequately and without the preparation which perhaps ought to attend any statements that are made by a Secretary of State. But I hope that my demonstrated faith and belief in the United Nations over the past 8 years, and the principle of the United Nations long before that, is such that any inaccuracies will be forgiven.

I suppose that the United Nations at the present time is going through its most difficult period.

¹Made before the opening plenary session of the American Association for the United Nations at Washington on Mar. 1. For text of an address made before the Association by James J. Wadsworth, U.S. representative to the General Assembly, see p. 417.

Words of Appreciation From the President

Following is the text of a telegram sent by President Eisenhower to Clark M. Eichelberger, executive director of the American Association for the United Nations, on the occasion of the Association's conference, which convened at Washington on March 1.

The conference of the American Association for the United Nations, which opens in Washington on March first, marks another year of remarkable service by your organization.

I know you are proud of this service. You have every reason to be.

As its name implies, the American Association of which you are executive director is for the United Nations. In scores of ways, you and your colleagues have furthered the cause of this great international organization. Your commission to study the organization of peace has contributed valuable ideas and suggestions to United Nations delegates. Your information program has not only informed American citizens of United Nations activities, but has created thousands of United Nations supporters—men and women eager to help make the U.N. an effective force for peace. The delegates from 110 national organizations which have accepted your invitation to this year's conference are living evidence of your success.

For your efforts you have, I know, the appreciation of delegates to the United Nations. I want you to know that you have mine, too. My warmest greetings to you and to the other members of the American Association for the United Nations.

Certainly, I hope it will not have a more difficult period. We had its launching at San Francisco nearly 8 years ago, in which I had the opportunity to share. At that time the United Nations embodied the hopes of many people throughout the world—hopes that were to a large degree exaggerated hopes. It is almost always the case, I suppose, when a new organization is launched that it carries more hope than it can, in fact, support. Certainly that was the case with the United Nations. Many people thought that the United Nations was automatically going to supply the answer to all the international problems of the world and that none of us would thereafter have

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to carry any burden of our own. Well, of course, the United Nations isn't that kind of an organization. The United Nations is just a place where we all meet together and whatever is done has got to be done by us and the other nations who make up the membership of the United Nations.

A Place for Collective Work

There is no new force magically brought into existence. The United Nations is merely a place where we can collectively work together more effectively than if we each work separately.

Now the United Nations was launched at the time when we were well aware of the importance of working with others. The name "United Nations" was, of course, the name given originally to a military alliance. It was organized by the so-called United Nations Declaration which was signed on January 2, 1942. And we saw that through that alliance, through working together—there were then 45 nations working together—it was possible to achieve results which we could not have achieved if we had all worked separately. Out of that experience of working together to win a terrible and desperate war, we had a very clear, dramatic demonstration of the importance of unity. And so the thought was why not preserve that unity and carry it on, so that we should continue to get the benefits of working together? That was the simple thought, really, which underlay the organization at San Francisco 8 years ago of the United Nations.

Well, as I say, that organization at its inception carried many hopes, many exaggerated hopes, and since then there has been a period of very considerable disillusion. Today there are some people who believe that the United Nations does not really serve any useful purpose; that we had better wind it up. That, I think, represents only a small minority of the peoples of the world and the peoples of the United States. A great majority still believe that the United Nations is a worthwhile experiment, but their faith is not as hot and burning as it was 8 years ago.

It is necessary, I think, to bring people to a better understanding of what the United Nations really is; what it can do, so that people will not continue to be disappointed and disillusioned by expecting from the United Nations something that in the present state of the world it cannot do.

We had hoped that the United Nations would guarantee all of us security. Well, article 43 of the Charter was set up with a view to establishing under the Security Council military contingents from the various member states which would act at the direction of the Security Council to prevent any aggression. That article has never been operative because the veto power is applicable to it. The Soviet Union has never permitted the organization of those military contingents.

When the attack on Korea occurred, it was pos-

sible to function under the Security Council at first because the Security Council at the moment was being boycotted by Soviet Russia. It was possible, as a result of that accident—I guess it was an accident—to get through a resolution which enabled the members of the United Nations to act together and act promptly to repel that act of aggression. After that initial action by the Security Council, the work was carried on through the Assembly where there is no veto power. And at first, at that time, there was a great wave of belief that we had at last found the answer to international aggression.

But as that effort bogged down in a military way, and as it became impossible to recruit large forces from any country other than the United States, gradually disillusionment arose and the feeling grew that the United Nations would not, in fact, be able to provide security. And I recall that in 1950—I was then a delegate at the United Nations Assembly—we had the so-called Uniting for Peace Resolution and the Peace Observation Commission Resolution, which were designed to try to apply the lessons of the Korean War and to organize the Assembly, where there would be no veto power, so it could have contingents and have the machinery to detect aggression promptly. By the very fact that it could detect aggression promptly, and could act immediately to prevent aggression, it has proved, so far at least, very difficult to give any substance to those two major resolutions that were adopted in 1950—the Uniting for Peace Resolution and the Peace Observation Commission Resolution, although the Peace Observation Commission is doing some work today in the Balkan areas, particularly in Greece.

Security Through Regional Organizations

But by and large I think the feeling has grown that security may have to be achieved primarily through regional organizations which are authorized by the United Nations Charter, but which to some extent function outside of the scope of the United Nations' direct authority. Consequently we have had a series of regional organizations develop. There was the Rio Pact for the Americas and the North Atlantic Pact—the scope of which has been extended so that it now includes Greece and Turkey. Then we negotiated—I had some part in that—the Pacific Security Treaties involving Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. We had the signing yesterday of the pact between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, and there is thought of creating a Middle East Organization.

Well, in a sense you may say that involves a departure from the principles and the hopes that are embodied in the United Nations Charter. But I have a feeling that after you get all these regional organizations made—they are all of them interlocking—and you finally put them all to-

gether, you may end up with just about what is contemplated by the United Nations Charter.

We may be going about it through the back door, but as long as we come out at the right place that is the important thing. I do believe that there is increasing recognition today of the principle upon which the United Nations was founded; namely, that security is a matter of interdependence.

These regional associations are so interlocking and more and more covering different areas of the world, so that now you have—I don't know how many—I suppose about 40 of the nations of the world tied together really by a series of interlocking regional security arrangements. That is actually a demonstration of the basic principle of the United Nations, and a realization of that principle in the ways which perhaps are at the moment the most practical, having regard to the exercise of the veto power by the Soviet Union in the United Nations through the Security Council.

Now we also had hopes that the United Nations would quickly realize great results in the social field and in the field of human rights. Well, there, too, there have been gains, and there have been delays, if not disappointments.

The United Nations developed and adopted without dissent in Paris in 1948—very largely Mrs. Roosevelt contributed to that result; we were together at that time in Paris—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a very splendid statement of the high ideals of the nations of the world with respect to human rights. That was a beacon which we set up in the hopes that all the nations of the world would be inspired by that to follow in the way that it pointed out. I believe that was a fine and worthy act on the part of the United Nations. Whether or not the time has yet come when that can be translated into treaties of international force is a more debatable question, and there may be delays and some disappointments in that respect.

Treaties are laws, and laws to be effective must represent the judgment of the community to which they apply. Laws which merely reflect the effort by one community to impose its views on another do not conform to our conception of law as stemming not from above but from the judgment of people, the mores of people, the feeling of the community as to what is the right thing to do. Laws which reflect an effort of some, and impose their will upon another, seldom operate unless by force or by war. And the primary need at the moment is to develop within the nations of the world the kind of sentiment so that, if and when there is a covenant on human rights and things of that sort, that treaty will be acceptable because it is what the people want to do.

I am not sure today that that is the state of the world; that there is a sufficient unity of judgment, of education, religion, so that we take a com-

mon view as to what are the rights of individuals. And perhaps the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not purport to be a legal instrument, but merely a statement of ideals. It may have to be supported in the first instance primarily by campaigns of education, publicity, increased knowledge, and an example of what goes on in other parts of the world so as to create a foundation for what may ultimately be a law that stems from the will of the community itself.

Great Changes May Come Slowly

Well, now, however these things may be, they do not prove that the United Nations does not have a great purpose, a great function in the world. What it proves is a thing which we really should know; namely, that great changes, great developments, usually come about slowly and not by a very sudden development. Sometimes they seem to come about by a sudden development, but only if a great deal of preparatory work has already been done so that the ground has been laid.

I believe that we are moving toward a world of greater security through collective effort. I believe we are moving toward a world where there will be a greater respect for human rights. But I think we must recognize that these things are not going to come about by a stroke of the pen, through some act which may be signed by the United Nations. There has to be preceding that a great deal of effort, education, and the United Nations is the way by which we can readily carry on, and more readily carry on, that campaign of national and international education so that we have a better understanding of what is in our common interests.

One of the weaknesses perhaps of the American people is that we want things to happen very quickly, and if they don't happen very quickly we become disappointed and turn away and try something else. This is a time to realize that the United Nations has goals which are very much worthwhile, but like most worthwhile goals they are not going to be achieved without effort miraculously overnight. There is a long hard road ahead. We must pursue that road with courage, determination, and with high hope. If we do, I am sure we shall reach the goals—perhaps not this year or next year—but maybe in 5 years, or maybe 10 years. The fact that it takes a long time to get to a goal, a vital goal, is no reason for not starting. It is all the more reason for starting quickly and pursuing it with resolution and determination.

I am sure that that is the conviction of you who are here today. I know that you have an opportunity to influence great masses of our fellow citizens, and I hope that you will persevere in the faith to which you are dedicated, and that you will spread that faith, because the United Nations does represent something which is sound, which is

bound in the long run to prevail. It represents an effort which men have had as their goal generation after generation. Sometime it will be reached. If there isn't the time to reach it, it will only be because great disaster intervenes, because of our lack of courage, lack of hope, lack of faith.

So you have a great responsibility. I can assure you that your Government under President

Eisenhower, as he said in his message to you here tonight, is dedicated so far as it is concerned to achieve that goal. But also I can say to you that we know that we cannot achieve that goal without the kind of help and support which only you can give us. So I come here merely to tell you of our faith, of our hope in the United Nations, and our faith and our hope that you will help us to achieve those goals.

Developing and Consolidating Western Europe's Defenses

by Lincoln Gordon

Chief of the MSA Mission to the U.K.¹

In presenting my credentials this afternoon, I want to talk about our common problem in the Atlantic community of taking effective action, in the face of unprecedented external dangers, to secure our freedom in what President Eisenhower termed last week this "century of continuing challenge." That problem focuses on the common defense and its economic foundations.

In recent months, and especially since the NATO Ministers' meeting at Paris in December,² the public prints have taken to viewing with alarm the position and prospects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We read that the effort is letting down, that the Allies are divided over objectives and strategy, that economic pressures have led country after country to cut its defense program, and the like. This is a faulty picture. I believe it arises from failure to understand properly both the actual status and the nature of NATO's current efforts in the development and consolidation of Western European defenses.

NATO represents an historic departure in several ways. The adoption of the treaty was the most striking formal symbol of the end of American isolationism, with the declaration that aggres-

sion anywhere in the treaty area will be regarded as an attack on all the members.

It is unique in another way as well. Starting simply as a traditional type of alliance, it has now been transformed into an operating coalition. It possesses military forces integrated under Supreme Allied Commands. It provides for systematic cooperation in the planning of national defense contributions to the common cause, in the development of airfields and other military construction, and to some extent in the planning of defense production and the formulation of broad political policies of common concern.

Three years ago, NATO policies were the responsibility of a series of intermittently meeting ministerial committees in the respective fields of foreign affairs, defense, and finance. The basic pattern was, to use an Americanism, buck passing; finance ministers waiting for defense ministers to state their needs and desires; defense ministers waiting for finance ministers to say what could be afforded; and foreign ministers waiting for both.

Today we see the civilian and military authorities looking simultaneously at military requirements and economic resources and working together on a full-time basis to push forward a realistic program for the buildup of forces, construction, and production. There is continuous review of where we actually stand, and continuous development of specific do-able measures for moving forward in creating real forces backed by adequate reserves.

This process of meshing military requirements and economic capabilities into a specific program

¹Address made before the American Chamber of Commerce at London on Jan. 28 and released to the press by the North Atlantic Treaty Information Service. Mr. Gordon, who also serves as U.S. Minister for Economic Affairs in London, participated in the U.S.-U.K. economic discussions held at Washington Mar. 4-7; see p. 395.

²See BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1953, p. 3, for the text of a communique summarizing the results of the meeting.

of action was undertaken first at the end of 1951 by the Temporary Council Committee, in which I had the honor of assisting the chairman, Averell Harriman. The job was admittedly a crude one, but it dealt with the right questions, and the Lisbon agreements which flowed from it represented a major forward step in the realistic strengthening of Western defense.

Now in a more thorough-going manner, NATO is coming to grips with the hard day-to-day complexities of a modern defense buildup—something which is well understood by national authorities in the major nations but which has never before been put on an international basis in peacetime.

Discussions at Paris Meeting

In this field, the Paris meeting of ministers in December, which I attended also, was an interim session to review progress since Lisbon, and to fix certain guidelines for the further buildup whose definitive size and content will be determined this spring. As you know, we ended 1952 with results very close to those projected at Lisbon. It has been said in uninformed quarters that decisions were taken in the December meeting to call a halt to a further buildup. This is simply not true. The size of the force goals for this year and next was not even a subject of consideration. That matter will be determined at the spring meeting.

The December session did give new emphasis to quality, as compared with quantity of forces. Public attention has unfortunately been riveted on the single factor of numbers of ground divisions. Such numbers catch the public eye, and can be seriously misleading. Divisions can vary enormously in real fighting capacity, depending on their state of training and equipment, the speed with which reserves can be mobilized, the strength of supporting units, the volume of ammunition reserves, and other factors. I only wish there were some ready way of summarizing all these factors in a headline phrase, since they are the substance of effective, as against mere paper, ground forces. If there is such a phrase no one has been able to come up with it. In any case, Western defense does not depend only on armies; it is a balanced collectivity of ground, air, and naval strength.

The decisions on military construction, or "infrastructure," have also been misunderstood. Provision was made in December for the immediate financing of 80 million pounds' worth of most urgent requirements. This, although a good deal less than the total high priority needs put forward by the Supreme Commander, did not mean scraping of the remainder. It meant simply an immediate decision to finance promptly what must be covered to avoid loss of a construction season, the rest being dealt with as part of the total plans for further buildup being developed for the spring meeting.

I know of no responsible participant or observer

concerned with these matters who does not view a continuance of the defense buildup as a sheer necessity, in view of the existing and potential Soviet military threat. The problem is of course political, economic, and psychological, as well as military, but I stress the side of physical security as still the most urgent and critical before us.

There are, of course, differences of opinion as to the pace and extent of the further buildup which is desirable and possible. But there is no doubt whatever that a further buildup is proceeding and will continue. As was stated in the British White Paper reporting on the Paris meeting:

If the risk of a general war today appears to have receded, this is because the NATO countries are resolved to resist aggression by combining and developing their armed strength. Any slackening in this effort could only defeat their purpose; the process must go forward until our strength is in itself a solid deterrent to any temptation to attack us.

Regarding the defense program of the United Kingdom itself, the White Paper pointed out that

The recent modifications in our program reflect a change of emphasis in some fields, but in no sense a reduction in the present scale of our rearmament effort. Indeed, next year we intend to spend more on defense than this year. This is broadly true of the NATO effort as a whole.

NATO Planning on Flexible Basis

How long and how far this necessity will have to take us it is impossible to estimate. Having no aggressive intent ourselves, we cannot simply build to a fixed target by a fixed date. Security can only be relative in any case, and we are seeking security against a potential threat which is itself fluid in character and which must be met by at least equal resiliency and resourcefulness in defense. Hence the wisdom of NATO's decision to put its forward planning on a continuous and flexible basis, projecting each year revised plans for the coming 3 years.

Certainly there is no cause to fear that the situation calls for eternally growing defense burdens, compelling the free world to convert to a garrison state as the price of survival. After all, the ratio of free world to Soviet resources is 4 or 5 to 1. If this effort, which now absorbs 10 to 15 percent of our national output, seems burdensome to us, how must a parallel effort weigh upon them, despite all the machinery of slavery at their command?

Of course, a defense buildup of this kind is costly, not to say painful. This is especially the case for peoples of wholly peaceful intent, who desire only to beat their swords into ploughshares, and who hoped in 1945 that this consummation would become immediately possible.

Today we are in the process of making up for the grave disparity we unwisely permitted to develop when the free world demobilized so rapidly

after the war, so rapidly, at least in our case, that General Marshall described it as "disintegration, not demobilization." There is every reason to believe that the effort can be leveled off, and perhaps tapered down, when this disparity has been further reduced or eliminated. Then, as our total resources continue to increase, the burdens of defense should become proportionately lighter. But, frankly, I see no magic formula by which these burdens can be conjured away in the now foreseeable future.

Given the free world's vast superiority in resources, these burdens should certainly be economically tolerable. But they are not automatically so. They will be so only if we can create and maintain an expanding world economy and economic as well as political and military unity in the free world.

There is of course some conflict between these economic and security objectives. It would be far easier to recreate normal trade and exchange relations if the world were not divided by the cold war and if internal financial stability were not endangered by heavy expenditures on arms. Our task must nonetheless be to accomplish both, to maintain the common defense and to strengthen our economic foundations at one and the same time.

The European Dollar Problem

There are, fortunately, certain long-term economic developments which should ease this task. The European dollar problem, which is obviously of as great concern to you as businessmen as it is to governments on both sides of the Atlantic, has had its counterpart in the chronic international-payments surplus of the United States. The recent report of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the very interesting final communique of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference³ alike stressed the need for constructive action on the part of both debtor and creditor countries if the imbalance in the free world's trade and payments is to be righted.

One major source of increase in the supply of dollars available to the rest of the world should result from the increasing need of the United States to import raw materials. The remarkably thorough report published last summer by the President's Materials Policy Commission (the Paley Report)⁴ showed that a decade ago we crossed the watershed from a materials surplus to a materials-deficit nation, and that over the next 25 years we might expect to increase our net imports of materials to over three times the present volume.

Some reviews of this report have expressed alarm at the prospect of the United States "gob-

bling up" an even larger share of the world's materials. Such critics are quite prepared for us to be damned for not making more dollars available abroad and also to be damned for making them available by buying more abroad. But we do not accept the implied premise—that supplies are so limited that what comes to us is necessarily unavailable to others. We would rather bring about the expansion of supplies, an expansion essential to a growing world economy, and in the interests alike of exporters and importers of materials. Such expansion will involve a much greater volume of dollar investment in underdeveloped areas.

Additional dollars from increased American purchases and investment abroad will, of course, not flow automatically to Britain or other nations of Western Europe. They must be earned, and they can be earned only if prices, delivery terms, and sales effort on manufactured goods will earn them. In this connection, frankly I was shocked and amazed at a comment in a responsible British journal to the effect that Europe could hope to earn few of the dollars resulting from greater American imports of materials. It argued that these additional imports would come in large measure from Canada and Latin America, and that propinquity and taste would lead these countries to buy more American manufactured goods rather than European. But these are markets in which there is no tariff preference for American manufactures; in one of them, indeed, there is Imperial preference. If in free and fair competition Britain and the Continent are unable to compete with American exporters, if Europe is unable either to convert Latin American tastes to European goods or to convert European goods to Latin American tastes, then the international economic outlook is indeed gloomy. I refuse to be so pessimistic.

As to the outlook for American trade policy itself, I am of course not in a position to speak for the new Administration or the new Congress. I should, however, like to call your attention to the careful factual review of recent experience with the American tariff contained in an article by my associate, Winthrop Brown, in your own publication, the *Anglo-American News* of last December. In my view, Mr. Brown has shown conclusively that the American tariff and the so-called "escape clause" in the reciprocal trade-agreements act are far more feared than they deserve, that these obstacles are indeed often more psychological than real. I do not suggest that the American market is easy to compete in; it takes ingenuity, resolution, and drive. But an increasing number of British and other European businessmen have pointed the way. Their successful efforts warrant much wider public knowledge and emulation.

Even the common defense effort itself, which on balance certainly makes our economic problems more rather than less difficult, is not wholly with-

³ For text of the communique, see p. 408.

⁴ For excerpts, see BULLETIN of July 14, 1952, p. 54.

out advantages in tempering the short-term dollar problem. It results in very considerable American military expenditures abroad, including our contributions to NATO construction. One new element of increasing importance, moreover, is the program of offshore procurement of material for NATO forces, which is being vigorously pursued at the present time. This program of offshore procurement accomplishes a 3-fold purpose. It provides arms and equipment for Western European defense; it helps build up Western European capacity for defense production; and it creates a dollar market of substantial magnitude.

Over 700 million dollars' worth of offshore procurement orders were placed in Britain and other NATO countries during the 12 months ending last June. You are, of course, all familiar with the recently placed contract in the United Kingdom for 90 million dollars to provide the fine British Centurion tank in substantial quantity for use by Dutch and Danish forces. During our fiscal year ending this coming June, the total volume of offshore procurement for the NATO countries is expected to be a thousand million dollars or more.

While offshore procurement cannot be regarded as a permanent arrangement any more than economic aid, it can be a most helpful element indeed in bridging the difficult transition from our present position to a more stable and normal international system of trade and payments.

The Outlook for the Future

Finally, I should like to comment on another often expressed fear—the fear not that defense burdens are too large, but that their reduction, especially in the United States, may set off a depression which will pull the economic rug out from under the free world. At the moment the American economy is operating at very high levels indeed, with virtually full employment, and yet no signs of excessive inflationary pressure. I have seen too many bad guesses to venture one of my own, but I can report with pleasure a consensus of private and official opinion that the signs all point to maintenance of a high and stable level of activity at least through this calendar year.

The fears mainly concern the longer run, when American defense expenditures are expected to decline. But again, past experience gives reassurance. Expenditures on our national-security programs as a whole are now running at a rate of about 52,000 million dollars per year. As forecast by the Truman administration, they would reach a peak in 1954 of 55 to 60,000 million dollars, and then fall gradually to a plateau of 40 to 45,000 million dollars per year. This would involve a drop between peak and plateau of 10 to 20,000 million dollars per year, or 3 to 6 percent of our gross national product. By contrast, from the wartime peak of 1944 to the year 1946, the equivalent

drop in present-day prices was from 142 to 25,000 million dollars per year, or over 40 percent of the then gross national product. That drop, although almost 10-fold of the reduction anticipated over the next few years, was absorbed with remarkably little disturbance.

While the situations are by no means entirely parallel, since there was then a tremendous backlog of civilian needs to be filled, it seems reasonable to expect that this much more moderate prospective decline in defense expenditures, assuming that it takes place, can be smoothly absorbed. Certainly the opportunities for expanded consumption and civilian investment markets, both in the United States and abroad, make such a smooth readjustment possible.

I would conclude, then, that the tasks facing the free world, while difficult and challenging, are not unmanageable given the will to do them, the understanding by both governments and peoples of what must be done, and above all, the resolution to maintain mutual cooperation as the basis of our policies. In this cooperation, Anglo-American unity has a special place, since history and geography have placed on our shoulders the foremost responsibility for leadership in this effort. I feel confident that under President Eisenhower's guidance the United States will continue to play its proper part.

EDC Foreign Ministers Meet at Rome

Following is the text of a communique issued at Rome on February 25 at the conclusion of a meeting of the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg:

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states of the European Community met on February 24 and 25 at Rome under the presidency of M. Van Zeeland, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The six ministers first discussed the problem of economic integration within the framework of the European community on the basis of proposals presented by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Beyen.

These proposals are based upon the principle of the collective responsibility of the community in creating progressively a tariff union as one of the essential elements of a common market. In the spirit of the Luxembourg resolution the six ministers reaffirmed that the progress of the community of the six countries is tied to the establishment of common bases of economic development and to a fusion of the essential interests of the member states.

The six ministers unanimously recognized that vast economic integration and notably the creation of a single market would contribute to the

reinforcement of the economy of the community and to the betterment of the standard of living of their populations and that this would constitute an essential element of the countries desiring to create among themselves a European Political Community.

This market should be created progressively taking into account the need to avoid disequilibrium or serious difficulties in economic and social fields. To this end safeguarding clauses as well as compensation measures could be provided.

The ministers decided to undertake without delay with the assistance of experts the study of measures for the application of the above-mentioned principles.

The ministers then examined the state of progress of ratification of the EDC Treaty and unanimously declared themselves convinced that in order to afford concrete proof of their determination to realize the European idea and to take into account the dangers which weigh incessantly upon

free Europe it is necessary to achieve the creation of the European army without delay.

The ministers noted that the treaty instituting the EDC has been placed before the parliaments of all member countries and affirmed that their respective governments intended to support the project before their parliaments emphasizing its extreme urgency.

The ministers noted the discussions which have recently taken place in the permanent interim committee, within the framework of the mandate conferred upon it at the time of the signature of the treaty relating to certain proposals put forth by the French Government. The ministers charged the interim committee to continue its work, taking into account the responsibilities that certain of the parties assume overseas, and to reach conclusions relative to the interpretative texts of the treaty as quickly as possible without hindering the procedures under way in the different parliaments.

U. S. Again Attempts To Enlighten Czechoslovakia on Provisions of the Mutual Security Act

The American Embassy at Prague on March 4 transmitted a note to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reply to a Czechoslovak note of January 30, 1953, making various false charges about activities of the U.S. Government under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act.

Following is the text of the U.S. note together with the Czechoslovak note of January 30:

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 4

Press release 123 dated March 4

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's note of January 30, 1953 concerning various false charges about activities of the United States Government under the Mutual Security Act.

The United States Government has examined the contents of this note and finds that the Czechoslovak Government has added nothing new, except certain propaganda elaborations, to the same familiar allegations as to aggressive policy and interference in Czechoslovakia's domestic affairs which the United States rejected in its note of November 18, 1952¹ and which it categorically rejects again. It will be recalled that similar charges against the Mutual Security Act by the

Soviet Union were rejected overwhelmingly by the General Assembly of the United Nations in January, 1952.²

The United States has seriously endeavored to explain the purpose of the MSA to assist, in accordance with principles of the United Nations Charter, the organization of collective defense and the preservation of international peace. The United States has also clearly shown in its note of November 18 that the United States has not carried on aggressive activity under Section 101 (a) of the MSA but has operated instead a broadly constructive and purely humanitarian program for reception, care and resettlement of refugees from Communist oppression. This program is an expression of a fundamental part of the American character to extend sympathy and asylum to political refugees who seek freedom abroad which they cannot obtain at home.

Unalterably wedded to its own distorted conception of the outer world, the Czechoslovak Government chooses to see only subversion in humanitarian assistance to the victims of oppression and only aggression in the efforts of the free world at collective defense. If in spite of the factual account of the MSA and activities under it which has been given in previous United States notes,

¹ For text of a statement made on these Soviet charges by Mike J. Mansfield, U.S. delegate to the General Assembly, see *ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1952, p. 128.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 1, 1952, p. 850.

this Communist delusion remains, the United States must leave to world opinion where credence is to be placed.

The United States is confident that the note of the Czechoslovak Government will be recognized for what it is as part of a frenzied campaign throughout the areas sealed off from freedom to maintain a tyrannical rule by means of savage police controls, trumped up show "trials", vicious propaganda attacks and other measures to impose absolute conformity of behavior and opinion. The Czechoslovak Government apparently considers anyone who does not willingly accept such conformity as an "American agent" and one who seeks escape from it by a "Freedom Train", a "Freedom Duck" or by any one of the many other vehicles which human ingenuity has utilized for reaching freedom as either an agent or a victim of kidnapping. In accord with its traditions the American nation feels profound sympathy for any people who, deprived of its freedom, remains devoted to its lost liberties.

The purpose of the Czechoslovak Government's note is revealed in the numerous propaganda clichés contained in the text, the falsity and calumny of which are transparent to all. The question arises how seriously the recipient, other Governments or even the people in Czechoslovakia can take a diplomatic note which attempts to establish a connection between Hitler's policies and those of the United States, or which charges that efforts of the United States to help European countries achieve economic stability and security against aggression bring only economic chaos and American occupation. The United States is content to leave the answers to such questions and the proper judgment of such accusations to other nations.

The United States Government itself condemns this attempt of the Czechoslovak Government to discredit the MSA and the worthy purposes it serves. The United States also regards as totally unwarranted and unacceptable the Czechoslovak Government's act of arrogation in interpreting, to suit its wishes, the nature of Section 101 (a) of that Act and the activities carried on under it. Convinced that the entirely humanitarian program maintained under this authorization for the relief of the victims of Communist oppression will be recognized by world opinion as the very antithesis of the pursuit of aggressive purposes, the United States is determined to continue this vitally needed assistance to refugees from the countries behind the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe.

TEXT OF CZECH NOTE OF JANUARY 30

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the U.S. of America and with reference to the Embassy's note Nr. 166 of November 18, 1952, has the honour to advise the following:

In its earlier notes addressed to the Embassy of the U.S. of America in Prague, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs quoted a number of irrefutable facts, proving interference into Czechoslovakia's domestic affairs by the Government of the U.S. From the instances listed in these notes it is evident that the American authorities, and in particular the American espionage agencies, are carrying out their hostile activity in the first place by sending out their paid agents, spies, diversionists and murderers to Czechoslovak territory, that these so-called "selected persons" are financed and equipped in accordance with the provisions of the U.S. Mutual Security Act, by means allocated under this act, and finally that the subversive activities of these criminals are carried out under instructions by these same authorities.

The Government of the U.S. chose to make an evasive reply to the sharp protest addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the U.S. on October 13, 1952¹ in connection with certain particularly outrageous crimes of American terrorist agents. This is easily understood. The American weapons and the documents found in the possession of the American agents who murdered two members of the local national committee in Revníčov, district Nova Straseč, American grenades and noiseless pistols specifically designed for purposes of assassination—the usual equipment of diversionist agents sent to Czechoslovak territory by the American espionage service—and in particular the number of American agents rounded up by the Czechoslovak security organs constitutes such documentary proof that it is impossible for the Government of the U.S. to escape responsibility for flagrant violations of the most elementary principles of international law, regulating the peaceful co-existence of nations.

In its note the Government of the U.S. has passed over in silence a series of very concrete charges made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and did not take position with respect to them, nor did it condemn the crimes committed by American agents or deny the evidence as to the direct connection between these agents and the U.S. occupation authorities and espionage organs in Western Germany and Austria. Instead, the Government of the U.S. attempted to substitute slander and insult for its lack of arguments and to disguise the true nature of its aggressive policy by general declarations as to its peaceful intentions.

In its note the Government of the U.S. claims that the so-called Mutual Security Act "is designed to strengthen the defense of the free world, to support the freedom of Europe through assistance to the defense of the NATO countries . . .".

This simulated concern for the freedom of Europe is but one of the forms of American interference into the domestic affairs of the nations of Europe and a pretext for America's policy of war preparations which instead of freedom and security, only brings American occupation, the loss of national sovereignty and economic chaos to the countries of Western Europe. The spontaneous and determined resistance of the peoples of Western Europe as well as in other parts of the world against this policy of the U.S. Government is proof of the ever growing awareness among the peoples of the entire world of the aggressive aims of the policy.

Under the so-called general agreement with Western Germany and the treaty of the so-called European Defense Community of May 1952, which the Government of the U.S. forced upon the countries of Western Europe, the German Fascist army is to be revived under the leadership of former Hitlerite generals and is to be integrated into the North Atlantic Pact system as an assault force against the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and other peace-loving countries of Peoples Democracy and at the same time as a gendarme against the peoples of Western Europe, whose resistance to the American policy of war and to American occupation the Government of the U.S. intends to break with the assistance of those proven oppressors of the

¹ *Ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 851.

freedom of the peoples of Europe—the German militarists and revanchists. There is need for more eloquent proof as to the aggressive nature of the Atlantic Pact, of the so-called Mutual Security Act and of the entire policy of the U.S., aimed at the unleashing of a new world war.

The Government of the U.S. attempts to justify its aggressive policy by references to the alleged threat from "the aggressive tendencies of international Communism."

The people of Czechoslovakia, taking a lesson from the experiences of Munich and the second world war, in the same way as the peace-loving people all over the world, have no doubts as to the true objectives of this pretext, designed to justify the aggressive policy of the U.S. Government.

This slander, taken over from the arsenal of Hitlerite propaganda, is a proof of a closer political relationship. It is a well known fact that under the slogan of "saving Europe from Communism" Hitler unleashed a world war, enslaved the peoples of Europe and caused mankind untold sufferings. The results of Hitler's policy, masking its criminal designs behind anti-Communist slanders, are equally well known. The North Atlantic war alliance, as is apparent even from the Embassy's note, is but continuation of the Hitlerite anti-Comintern pacts. Today the serious danger to world peace, the freedom and independence of nations stems from American imperialism, preparing a new world war.

The Embassy attempts to designate the act, which allocates the sum of a \$100 million to finance hostile activities directed against Czechoslovakia and other countries as a "humanitarian program" and as a measure of a purely charitable character. This allegation is fully disproved by the text and wording of the act itself. In its earlier notes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also referred to the debate of this act and in particular of the Kersten amendment. The members of the U.S. Congress and in the first place, Mr. Kersten, author of the amendment, declared quite openly that the act was intended to finance aggressive activities, the incitation to organized terror and the setting up of military units for aggression against a number of states, among which Czechoslovakia was explicitly mentioned.

The true fact of this American "humanitarian program," however, is best demonstrated by the American agents themselves—the murderers of peace-loving Czechoslovak citizens in Babice, in Revnicov and elsewhere. Their crimes are an inseparable component of the total balance of the Mutual Security Act. The Government of the U.S. of America denies responsibility for these crimes of American agents only in diplomatic notes, while in its official propaganda it openly proclaims that it is striving for a change of government in the Peoples Democracies and for the breaking of their alliance with the Soviet Union. Foremost representatives of the U.S. have declared quite unambiguously that they are striving for a change of regime in the Peoples Democracies.

One of the aspects of American policy is the organizing and utilization of Zionist and Titoist-Trotskyite espionage centers and conspiracies.

The recent trial of the group of conspirators led by Rudolf Slansky has clearly demonstrated that also in Czechoslovakia such a plot against the people and the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic had been planned by American agents.

In the course of the trial it was proved beyond any doubt that the espionage, sabotage and subversive activities of this group had been prepared over a long period of time, that since the time of World War II already its principal members had been agents of the American intelligence service and of other espionage organizations, co-operating with it and that American intelligence agencies had served themselves of the espionage organization of the Tito clique and of the espionage activity of Zionist organizations as a means for directing their agency in Czechoslovakia.

The trial further demonstrated that in their anti-

Czechoslovak activities the American intelligence organs enlisted the services of war criminals and agents of the Gestapo, who had caused the death of many of the heroes of the Czechoslovak peoples' struggle for freedom.

The relations between the American intelligence service and this group of conspirators are eloquently illustrated by the fact that, at a time, when Slansky, the head of the conspiracy, was about to be unmasked, the American intelligence service through its agent Kauders attempted to save him and organize his escape abroad. In this attempt, once again, the American broadcasting station bearing the name "Free Europe" was used. This is but one more confirmation of the fact that the broadcasting stations in the American zone of occupation in Germany are in the service of the hostile espionage and subversive activities of the American intelligence service—for which purpose they were quite openly set up by the American authorities. Thanks to the vigilance of the Czech security organs and of the entire Czech people however, this treacherous conspiracy, too, was frustrated and crushed.

The significance of the defeat which the American war program has suffered through the crushing of the American agency in Czechoslovakia is illustrated by the circumstance that the President of the U.S. of America considered it necessary to state his position re the trial with the espionage center in Czechoslovakia in an insulting and slanderous message addressed to the so-called Jewish Labour Committee.

The vigilance of the Czech people, which the U.S. Government in its note terms as "congenital suspicion of the Communists," and of which it complains quite understandably, is a serious obstacle in the way of the activities of American agents. It is, nevertheless, surprising that the U.S. Government's note speaks of "suspicion" at a time when this same government by its boundless panicked suspicion is arousing the indignation of world public opinion and the protests of its own allies.

In its note the Government of the U.S.—quite inappropriately—went so far as to criticize the domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia. The enthusiastic endeavor of the Czech people in the construction of its country, the constant and progressive increase of its economic, social and cultural level convincingly disprove these slanders.

In its note the Embassy alleges that a "hate campaign" against the U.S. is being conducted in Czechoslovakia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs absolutely rejects this allegation and refers to the consistent endeavor of the Czech Government for a lasting peace and friendship among nations. It is of course only natural that the hostile acts of the American authorities, the sending out of terrorist groups, spies and murderers, the hostile statements of American Government officials, as well as the direct plots of the U.S. Government against the peaceful construction and sovereignty of the Czech Republic arouse the deep scorn and contempt of the Czech people towards those who attempt to disrupt its work and are the enemies of its independence.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers absurd and unfounded the Embassy's allegations that the Ministry's protests against the hostile activities of the American authorities contribute to intensify international tensions. Not the Czech Government's justified protests calling for a discontinuation of the hostile activities of the American authorities, but these very activities and the U.S. policies of cold war, of aggression and intervention, are the source of international tensions and the cause of justified indignation on the part of the Czech people.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the name of the Czech Government therefore categorically rejects the note of the Embassy of the U.S. and once again resolutely protests against the aggressive provisions of the so-called Mutual Security Act and against the hostile activities of the American authorities against the Czech Republic.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the U.S. of America the assurance of its consideration.

The Question of War or Peace in Korea

by Gen. Omar N. Bradley

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

The most difficult subject which was suggested by your members [for discussion at the meeting] is the question: *War or Peace?* It is the top issue of the day—not only an issue here in the forum, but in every free nation in the world. The greatest and the most humble men and women in the world have devoted weeks, months, and years to the study of this question. Unfortunately no one has yet found a positive solution.

The ultimate decision of whether it will be total war or total peace seems to rest with a small group of men in the Kremlin over whom we have little control. On the other hand, I earnestly believe that the actions we Americans take will have considerable influence over these men. From a strictly military viewpoint, we already influence these realists by our possession of the atomic bomb and the ability to deliver it. In that way—through armed strength—if by no other means, I am sure that we can influence *their* final answer to this question which concerns the whole world: Will it be total war, or will it be total peace?

I take no pleasure in the discussion of this subject, in spite of its importance. I know something of war—its terror, its courage, and its unlimited cost. I would prefer to speak about the absence of war, the duties of citizens, the privileges and rights of free men, and the greatness of America. These are more constructive ideas.

But I would not evade this issue. If it can be solved by thought and discussion, I will gladly contribute what I can. At best, I can only present the situation as I see it from a military point of view. Today, in our discussion, I am not proposing a solution to this difficult question. I believe there is a solution; I believe that the world will

some day find an answer; I know that our President is dedicated to finding a solution to this problem if it can be found.

The question of war or peace would certainly appear to be academic when we face the fact that Americans, South Koreans, and units of 14 other nations are fighting—and have been fighting for over 2 years—on the peninsula of Korea. Frenchmen are fighting alongside the Vietnam forces—and have been for over 7 years—in Indochina. The British have been opposing Communist aggression in Malaya for an interminable time.

In spite of these conflicts, however, today's question of war or peace deserves our careful attention when we realize that a third world war would be far more terrible than the present combined crises in Korea, Indochina, Malaya, and the other trouble spots around the globe.

Since I am not a philosopher, I have neither the qualification nor the inclination to treat the matter of war academically. As a soldier, and one who has visited our battlefronts in Korea recently, I know that *the war in Korea* is far from being an academic subject. No matter how we limit its geographical boundaries, or curtail its casualties—for the man in the frontline, the airman who dog-fights a MIG-15, or the navy man who bombards the shoreline—it is as real and as dangerous as any total war could be. His only comfort lies in the fact that so far his people at home have not borne the brunt of the attack. I also know from talking to these men that it is of considerable comfort to them that the war in Korea has not spread into a total war with its atomic overtones.

But the fighting men in the Far East, as well as the people at home, are tormented by the worry and sacrifice which this war against Communist aggression in Korea continues to demand. Although the peoples of the free world realize that Korea must be viewed in its proper perspective—

¹ Address made before the Palm Beach Round Table at Palm Beach, Fla., on Mar. 2.

that Korea is just one small part of the greater Communist aggression and imperialism toward free men—we derive little comfort from viewing our present struggle in Korea as a small part of a regional or global situation. To me, as to many other Americans and South Koreans and Frenchmen and Canadians and Britishers and Turks and other allies, Korea is a war which is costing us large sums of money and much of our resources. Americans are losing their lives over there, and even though the casualties are low in comparison to a greater world war, we can take no comfort from that fact. We entered this war to stop aggression and we want a decision for peace.

War by Satellite

Personally, I feel that the war-by-satellite technique which communism has adopted is the most irritating, frustrating method they could choose. It causes the free nations of the world to expend lives and resources without getting to the real cause of trouble or the fundamental source of Communist power. At the same time, I know that we will not provoke a third world war even to reach these troublemakers. I am equally sure that we will not default our freedom to the Communists by appeasement. We must resolutely take issue with Communist aggression wherever it forces its way.

Peace and good will are hard to come by. There is no magic carpet on which men can ride into a warless world. If we are to reach an accord between nations, we shall do so by climbing painfully up a ladder toward the resolution of difficulties that bar peace in this world.

We shall always be tragically in need of ideals in attaining a peaceful world, but those ideals are at the top of the ladder; they do not make up the rungs. Our progress up the ladder toward that goal must be steadfast; the rungs of the ladder consist of difficult situations which we must meet and resolve in favor of freedom.

Korea is one of these difficult situations.

There was no other choice for us in June 1950. We had to draw the line against Communist aggression; the decision was hailed throughout the free world as a most courageous one, and one that was properly timed.

I believe that that decision—as much as it has cost us—saved Southeast Asia from being overrun in 1950 and 1951. I also believe that our brave and courageous resistance gave a new breath of life and a new meaning to the authority of the United Nations.

And further, I believe that our action in Korea may have prevented—or at least forestalled for some time—the Soviet Union's step-by-step aggression leading to world war III.

But that decision—as right as it was—has not made our problem easier. The question of war or peace—if we mean total war or total peace—is

still before us, and the future courses of action we choose—in Korea and elsewhere—can only be milestones on the road to that ultimate decision.

Four Courses of Military Action

What I have to say now about Korea is only my personal opinion, and from a strictly military viewpoint. In broad perspective, I believe that the United Nations have four courses of military action open to us in Korea:

One course of action—but one which I believe the American people and their allies would not condone—would be to withdraw our forces and get out of Korea. This would greatly jeopardize the authority of the United Nations. And all of our allies would begin to lose confidence. Furthermore, our great efforts and sacrifice would appear to have been in vain. Finally, communism in Asia would have a free rein and the tyranny which accompanies communism—already so vividly painted in blood in China—would spread like a plague across all of Asia to include our friends in Southeast Asia and India and Pakistan.

Second, we could continue the present pressure in Korea, keeping our casualties to a minimum, and causing the greatest casualties to the enemy that we could inflict.

The third course of military action open to the United Nations is of greater scope than the second: We could continue the present pressure in Korea, causing the greatest casualties possible to the enemy; and we could take the additional military steps, from time to time, where a military advantage might accrue. We would hope that the Communist Chinese, because of increasing pressure, would get tired and eventually quit. But even some of these additional measures in Korea might require high-level international decisions, for all of them are not entirely within the present scope of military authority.

The fourth course of action is a big step beyond the third: It involves taking any one, or any combination, of military steps open to us *in order to get a decision in Korea* even while we realize that it might eventually involve us in an all-out war with Communist China. We must realize that broadening the war in this way might pin down the bulk of our military power on the continent of Asia, and could eventually develop into world war III.

We would have to assess the risk with each step taken. We would have to be prepared for the countermeasures the Communists could take and the countermeasures that eventually the Soviet Union might take because of the Sino-Russian treaty.

Preliminary to this course of action, it would seem to me that the United Nations, and especially the United States, would have to make long-term foreign-policy decisions on future relations in the Far East.

Other Possible Steps

The additional military steps referred to in the many discussions of these third and fourth courses of action are divided into many possibilities. Some could be taken alone, or several could be taken in combination. You have undoubtedly read about some of them in your newspapers and have heard many of them discussed in public:

1. By adding to our forces in Korea—which would call for a much greater mobilization of men and industry—and taking the necessary casualties, U.N. Forces could drive to the Yalu River and free Korea of the Communist Chinese.

2. We could extend the air war into Manchuria. This would require bombardment of the Communist airbases across the Yalu and would have to include the devastation of the communications centers and military targets in the manufacturing centers of Manchuria, if it were to be effective.

3. The United Nations could intensify the economic sanctions. Everyone realizes that some strategic materials are still being delivered to the enemy.

4. To augment this the United Nations could declare a naval blockade. This course of action is complicated by the status of the British colony Hong Kong. Naval experts tell us that to be most effective this action would have to include the blockade of two Chinese ports now under control of the Soviet Union: Dairen and Port Arthur, and the blockade of coastal shipping.

5. Another course of action—which could advance our line to the narrow waist of Korea—would be a combined ground, air, and navy offensive.

6. We could also continue the improvement and enlargement of the Republic of Korea forces so that fewer American divisions are in the line. We have already started on this, and only the economic and manpower limitations involved set a practical limit on this course of action.

7. Another factor which could be added to the war if a practical opportunity should present itself is the use of atomic weapons.

All of these possibilities—and many others—have been studied and considered in the past and are constantly being considered as ways and means of reaching a decision for the United Nations in Korea. Many of them have not been taken in the past because we didn't have the power to do them effectively; many of them were not taken—and are not taken now—because a military advantage does not accrue. Many of these actions could only be taken if the larger, high-level policy decisions were made.

I must make it clear at this point—and I hope that every newspaper and radio that reports this discussion will emphasize this for me—that I, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, am recommending neither for nor against any of these ac-

tions. It is not within my authority to decide such issues. My purpose is to discuss the situation rather than to urge a particular solution. I feel that we can arrive at a better solution if the public has as many of the facts as military security permits.

In this situation, and in the area of the larger decisions which future action might require, I would urge you to exercise all of your patience. I believe that we should give our new Administration—these newly elected and appointed leaders who are charting the international strategy that this Nation will follow—that we should give them time to reveal our policy in well-coordinated action. These men deserve our greatest support and patient understanding.

Role of Joint Chiefs of Staff

It is easy for the armchair strategist to choose a resolute and bold course of action for his country. I know that I have many acquaintances who urge upon me one or several of these military actions which I have discussed. I know that many people would like to ask at this point: What do the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that we do? What should be our national strategy and national policy in this perplexing situation?

I believe it is important for all of us to understand the role that the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in our national policy making, because many people believe that during times of stress like these "the military," as we are loosely labeled, have dangerous and undue powers in the influencing of our national policy. Actually, the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by law and by practice, is a subordinate role, and one which we zealously observe.

I would like to state my own personal views on what recommendations are actually in order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have outlined these views to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and to congressional committees, and in all quarters they have seemed to meet with general civilian approval.

It is important to remember—and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff we are constantly reminding ourselves—that military policy, and its included strategic planning, is *not* separate and distinct from our foreign policy. The two of them are part and parcel of our over-all policy for the safety and security of our Nation.

Under the National Security Act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged with several specific duties. Among these is listed "the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." We are charged with making strategic plans, and providing for the strategic direction of the military forces of the Nation in peace and war.

When the Government is considering the establishment of policy, the President receives recommendations from the Department of State from

a foreign policy view. He considers domestic political advice, including guidance from the Congress and existing laws. He studies the economic implications of the specific problem, considers the psychological aspects of the policy, and from the Department of Defense he gets military advice in connection with the proposed policy. The agency with which he discusses all the factors and which assists him in arriving at a decision is the National Security Council.

As the military advisers of the Government, we feel that our job is to take the various courses of action that are suggested in the problem and analyze them from the military viewpoint, telling the President, through the Secretary of Defense, what our *capabilities* are and as far as we know, what risks are being taken when we pursue either this course or that course.

Generally, however, I do *not* feel that it is Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility to *recommend specifically* which course of action the Government should take. We should confine our part to pointing out the military implications and military capabilities. Then, of course, after a decision is reached, we make recommendations on the military action required to carry out such decisions. No matter what the decision becomes, once it is made we do our utmost to carry out the military responsibilities which it involves.

Perhaps some people might feel that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should stand up and resolutely and strongly recommend a national policy which *we* would prefer, but to date I have not been convinced that this is the proper role of a military leader. I do not believe that military strategists should choose the course of government action, and I do not believe that we should publicly, or before congressional committees, fail to support the decisions made by our civilian superiors.

In congressional hearings we feel free to give our personal opinions and to point out the same capabilities and risks that we had pointed out before any decisions were made—so that the legislators will have as full and complete information as the Secretary of Defense, and the Commander in Chief, and the Secretary of State—but I do not believe that we should go beyond this.

U.S. Responsibility for World Leadership

The responsibility of our President and his National Security Council for war or peace cannot be minimized. Our friends as well as our enemies recognize the responsibility for leadership in world affairs that has been thrust upon us.

When we consider the responsibility that befalls the American people, we must remember that America's strategic position in the world today is the outgrowth of the strength we demonstrated in World War II. In both Europe and Asia political boundaries have been largely drawn on the lines where armies met and defeated the Axis.

If we are to keep our position, we must maintain our strength.

The United States is respected in the world today, not because she is rich but because she is strong. During the incubator period of World War II, our wealth was ridiculed as a sign of decadence. It was not until our people put that wealth to work in the manufacture of arms, the construction of ships, and the production of food that the vigor and strength of America became apparent throughout the world.

As long as nations know that our strength persists, as long as they are assured of our determination to use it against aggression, which in the end would menace us, the stronger our hand shall be in writing the terms for future living. For unless we show the capacity and willingness to sustain our commitments with adequate armed strength, we shall be forced to give up those commitments in the face of opposing power.

Even though we disapprove of the use of force in the settlement of international disputes, we cannot renounce that force while other nations cling to theirs. Our pleas for peace are measured not by the sincerity with which they are spoken but by the strength we can array to enforce them.

The greatest danger to our future would be the failure of our American people to understand precisely what strength means. More than ships, planes, and guns, we need an intelligent and well-informed public opinion—based on facts, not emotions; on realities, not dreams.

We dare not forget that there is nothing man can invent with his science, nothing man can devise from his knowledge, nothing man can create by his genius that war, if it comes, cannot destroy.

But I believe there is no such thing as an inevitable war. If wars can be provoked, they can also be averted. But they can be averted only if the peace-loving peoples of this world love peace enough to oppose aggression in whatever form it may recur. We cannot ignore the kindling sparks if we hope to avoid a conflagration. We cannot halt imperialism with moral indignation. If the United States is to exercise its conscience in world affairs, it must be prepared to back its moral indignation with realism, resources, and credits.

We must recognize that it is even more difficult to avert wars than to win them. The achievement of peace in this shattered world is a task requiring greater intellect, more daring, and perhaps even sterner sacrifice than we showed in helping to win World War II.

Armed Strength Essential for World Security

To meet this challenge, the American people must be prepared to sustain a bold foreign policy equal to our responsibilities in a world from which we cannot retreat. And we must contribute willingly to the maintenance of armed strength essential to the security and stability of this world in which we live.

I believe that there is an immediate need for support of the concept that combines military power and peaceful intention without unnecessary recourse to war. If we have the military power which will bring respect for our ideas, and our voices at the Council table, there is hope that we will never have to exercise that military power in all-out war. It is a mistake to assume that national military power is important only in case of coercion. The nation with strength is the nation with the power of persuasion, the power of purchase, and the power to bargain.

A military man especially dislikes prediction. However, since we are discussing the alternative of war or peace, I will venture that if we ever provide ourselves with the military power appropriate to our responsibilities, and then maintain it, we will achieve some of the peace of mind with less fear of war—and perhaps the actual peace in the world—that we all hope for and seek.

If we don't face this issue properly, we will be forced to deal inadequately from crisis to crisis with each problem that arises. And when a nation is relatively weak, even the smallest problem—which we would ordinarily take in stride—becomes a major difficulty.

A case in point today is Korea. It is my personal belief—and I have stated it many times before—that if we had not so completely demobilized our military power between 1945 and 1950, Korea might never have occurred.

I hope that all Americans have learned this lasting lesson: weakness invites attack. The Soviet Union, master mind of the Communist aggressions all over the world, watched the departure of our forces from South Korea and took this as a sign that the United Nations were not interested in protecting the South Koreans and were willing to let the Communists go ahead in Asia. The military realists in the Kremlin also must have smiled grimly as they watched the further demobilization of our American armed strength in 1949 and 1950.

I stated earlier that I believed the U.N. action in Korea had saved Southeast Asia, preserved the United Nations, and had perhaps prevented a world war III. As I conclude this discussion, I must say honestly to the American people—as unwelcome as it may be—that one of the greatest contributions which the Korean war has made to the world is the compulsory remobilization of some of our armed might. Even after World War II we had not learned that a nation as great as ours cannot be weak. We still had some idea that the United States had been given a special privilege among nations: that we could travel the searoads of the world, travel the airways of the world, influence the actions of all of the free nations of the world and aid them to resist communism, without establishing and maintaining the military strength to back up the world leadership which had become our role.

I am still not sure that we have learned the lesson completely, and sometimes I wonder if the American people sufficiently recognize the continuing need for adequate military power, and would maintain their military strength even if the war in Korea were concluded.

I have every confidence that if we have learned our lesson from Korea and from our past experiences, the ultimate decision on this mighty question will be in favor of freedom over tyranny, democracy over dictatorship, and will finally bring us *lasting peace* instead of *total war*.

Netherlands Expresses Gratitude To U. S. Military Forces

Press release 128 dated March 5

On March 5 Dr. J. H. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands, called on Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith and presented him with an aide memoire expressing the gratitude of the Netherlands Government for the assistance rendered during the floods by American military forces. In acknowledging the expression of gratitude, the Under Secretary said the U.S. Government was glad to have been of assistance and hoped conditions were improving. The text of the Ambassador's aide memoire follows:

As the Secretary of State is aware, the Queen of the Netherlands, on February 18, 1953, issued an Order of the Day to the Netherlands Armed Forces in which Her Majesty mentioned the excellent help received from Army, Navy, and Air Force units of various foreign powers by the Netherlands military forces in carrying out their duty in connection with the recent floods; a message to the same effect was communicated by the Netherlands Minister of War and Navy to his American, British and French colleagues.

The Netherlands Ambassador has now received instructions, with reference to the above statements, formally to express to the Government of the United States the heartfelt gratitude of the Netherlands Government for the assistance rendered during the floods by American military forces which were assigned so spontaneously for this purpose.

The tireless efforts of these American and other foreign troops contributed substantially to mitigate the initial consequences of the floods, and rendered invaluable assistance in effectuating preliminary repairs where these were needed most urgently, and thereby alleviated to a considerable degree the impact of the critical phase of the floods.

The Netherlands Government is deeply appreciative of this spontaneous and effective demonstration of international cooperation.

Mobilizing for a Just and Lasting Peace

by James J. Wadsworth

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated February 28

Instead of starting out by telling you who I am, I'd like to start by telling you who you are—just in case you don't fully appreciate yourself and your own power.

You represent more than 100 national organizations with a combined membership of more than 75 millions of members. That's a sizeable chunk of Americans—enough to swing an election—enough to tip the ship of state pretty heavily to one side or another—or to keep it riding steady. You, here, are the chosen leaders, the leadership group (in the language of the social scientists) among this impressive number of your fellow Americans, and the leadership group in the country which now carries the responsibility for the leadership of the free world is a very important group of people.

As good Americans I'm sure that you hold a great many opinions and that there have been some pretty hot discussions in and out of your meetings. There are probably organizations here who disagree completely on several important issues. But you are gathered here under the enterprising auspices of the American Association for the United Nations because there is one thing on which you all do agree: vigorous support for the United Nations. You know that the United Nations gives us all our best chance to work for a decent, peaceful world, and you've started working.

I started working—full time, that is—at the United States Mission to the United Nations just a week ago today. They tell me that if you want to be an expert on a foreign country you have to stay there either 3 days or 10 years. I guess it's the same for the United Nations, so my one week cuts me out as an expert. I can only give you some of my first impressions. At this point they are really just the impressions of a layman who's had

the valuable chance to get into the middle of things.

Of course I brought some ideas about the United Nations with me when I came. I've thought about it as a citizen, and I've done a lot of concentrated thinking about it since I heard I was named for this job almost a month ago. I've even gotten into a few discussions from time to time with all sorts of people—taxi drivers and Congressmen, students and businessmen.

Some people seem to have the idea that the United Nations would be all right if only the Russians and their satellites were thrown out. They complain that the Russians are holding up progress—as an example, their 55 vetoes in the Security Council—and even more important, that Soviet guns and planes are killing U.N. soldiers in Korea. They say that the United Nations is a very expensive loudspeaker for Russian propaganda, and that helping the United Nations helps to spread Kremlin lies.

Now I thought I knew the answers to those worries pretty well, before I came here. The chief value of the United Nations is that it is the only place in the world where 60 nations can sit down together and talk over the problems that are troubling us all. If the Russians weren't there, the talk might be a lot more enjoyable but it wouldn't have anything to do with the real problems of the real world in which the Russians play a very large and a very dangerous part.

Secretary of State Dulles in his book *War or Peace* says: "They"—the Russians, that is—"have power in the world, and if the United Nations gets away from the reality it becomes artificial and exerts less influence. The United Nations should mirror more accurately, not less accurately, the reality of what is."

You don't make any danger disappear by setting up a nice social organization in which you talk only to people who agree with you. You *do* something—and something important—to cut down the danger of Soviet expansion when the peoples of the world are given a chance to see it for

¹ Address made before the American Association for the United Nations at Washington on Mar. 2. For text of remarks made by Secretary Dulles before this association, see p. 402.

what it really is. We, the United States, could have the best propaganda outfit in the world telling people on all five continents that the Russians lie, that their peace talk is all lies, that they won't listen to reason, that they won't listen—period. But that would be just American propaganda, and most people would think we were exaggerating.

But in the United Nations they can see for themselves what the Russians are like. The United Nations is the one big hole in the Iron Curtain that they can't plug up. Certainly it gives the Russians a chance to make long blasts at the United States full of lying charges. But the lies are answered in the United Nations, not by one nation, but by many nations. If people learn through the U.N. debates that Russians are making ridiculous charges about American atrocities, they also learn that those charges were rejected by the General Assembly by a vote of 54 to 5. It has always seemed to me that that fact ought to be added up on our side.

The Russian Idea of Debate

As I said, I knew all this in theory before I came. Then this week I sat in on my first meeting of the Political Committee on Korea and had my first close-up view of the Russian idea of debate. I was amazed—to tell you the truth. How could they be so stupid? Couldn't Vyshinsky see for himself the skepticism and boredom on the faces of delegates who had heard the same preposterous charges dozens of times before? He didn't even try to be plausible. How could he expect this talk about a U.S. aggression in Korea to make any impression, when every delegate in that room knew that the United Nations' own Commission in Korea saw for itself the criminal Communist sneak attack from the north upon the young Republic of Korea? As a trial lawyer he must know that once a witness has been caught in one lie, the rest of his testimony doesn't carry very much weight.

I think that anyone who attends a few U.N. meetings is struck as I am by the value of the United Nations as a great mirror of truth—to use Mr. Dulles' phrase. It reveals the Russians as they really are. At the same time the Russians can see for themselves how their outrageous lies and inconsistencies are failing to weaken the essential unity of the free world. Only if they can convince themselves that this tactic won't work, will they ever be persuaded to give it up and get down to the business the United Nations was designed for.

Because this is so plain to all visitors, I have been thrilled to see the number of people who come to U.N. Headquarters every day. A week ago yesterday, when I was over there for a television broadcast with Ambassador Lodge, there seemed

to be thousands of them streaming into the Assembly building. And they're more than sightseers. The bookstore there is crowded with people who want to know more about the United Nations. I understand that the bookstore sells—not gives away, but *sells* more than 1,400 pieces of literature a day.

Again I've had a chance to see for myself a thing I've believed in for a long time; and that is the wide support the United Nations enjoys in the United States and the seriousness of public interest in the United Nations.

Of course, there are attacks on the United Nations, too, in various parts of the country. We can't ignore them but we can put them in their proper perspective, and stop giving them more attention than they are worth.

A great cause is judged by its enemies as well as its friends. On both counts the United Nations has a high score. Against it, we have a small group of small organizations with histories of extreme isolationism and hate-mongering. On the other hand, among the organizations which have declared their support for the principles of the United Nations and for strong U.S. participation in the United Nations, you have the distinguished group of organizations represented here today.

Critics vs. Enemies of the U.N.

Now I need hardly remind you that when I talk of enemies of the United Nations, I'm not talking about critics of the United Nations. I know that if the chairman of this meeting asked right now for criticism and suggestions for improving the United Nations, he'd be kept here all night. I might have a few suggestions myself.

I am not including in that group the troubled people who are misinformed or uninformed about the United Nations. Many of them are counted in the opinion polls as supporters of the United Nations, but they fall into the category of "yes but"-ers. They're for the United Nations—but.

Those "buts" are very important. It's part of my job, and it is part of your job too, to answer as many of them as we can.

Some people are in favor of the United Nations, but they're worried about the expense. I've never heard this complaint from anyone who knew the fact that the U.S. assessment for the United Nations, and for all of its specialized agencies this year, costs each American taxpayer exactly 16 cents. One speaker on the United Nations tells of an experience with a man who stood up in a meeting to complain about the U.N. drain on the American taxpayer. When he heard the 16-cent figure, the same man stood up and started thumping the table harder than ever. But this time he was complaining because he thought it was a disgrace that we each didn't spend a whole lot more than 16 cents a year on peace!

Some people are afraid that the Russians are learning our Korean battle plans at the United Nations. Actually the Unified Command sends the United Nations reports on the Korean action only after the event has taken place and at the same time as the report is released in the newspapers. Neither the United States, nor any other member Government, sends the United Nations any classified security information at all. It seems to me nothing short of disgraceful to let such a tragic piece of misinformation add to the trouble in the hearts of the families of soldiers in Korea.

There are some people who thoroughly understand and approve of the U.N. action to resist aggression in Korea, but criticize the United Nations because they think the United States is doing all of the fighting.

Actually, according to the latest reports, 75 percent of the frontline troops in Korea are non-Americans, and even the American divisions who are holding the other 25 percent of the line contain many elements of South Korean troops. *Who Says They Won't Fight?* is the title General Van Fleet gave to an article he wrote not so long ago about non-American United Nations troops in Korea. Let me quote one of the things he says.

"Fight? I'll say our allies will fight", says General Van Fleet. "Ask any American combat veteran who had a U.N. unit—any of them—on his flank during an offensive. Or ask him if he was confident or scared when he knew a U.N. unit adjoining his own was under heavy attack.

"No sweat," he'll say. "They're good soldiers."

The facts on most of these most prevalent "buts" are so clear and so reassuring that people welcome the truth. As that truth gets wider and wider circulation around the country, I'm sure we'll find that more people are more in favor of the United Nations than they think they are.

This leads me back to my statement earlier this evening about the importance of this audience. It is by your energy, your organizational skill, your influence with all of the media of mass communication, that we can get the truth about the United Nations and its accomplishments spread across the nation and incorporated into the thinking of every single American citizen. We don't have to sell the United Nations idea to the American people. They bought that long ago. The ideas and principles of the Charter are fundamental to our whole American philosophy. What we have to do is get out the facts and when the facts are known those of us who believe in the United Nations must believe that the truth will sell itself.

Perhaps it is not too much to say—and I say this in all humility—national humility as well as personal humility—that the issue of war or peace, freedom or slavery, poverty or human fulfillment, are in your hands and will finally be decided by the people in this room.

Peace in Korea does not lie in our hands alone.

As Ambassador Lodge has so forcefully stated just this last week in the General Assembly,² only the Kremlin can name the day when the fighting in Korea is to come to an end, on honorable terms.

But our enlightened leadership of free men everywhere can hasten the day when the Kremlin will be forced to recognize that violent lawlessness is no longer practical.

For I am one of those who believe that this country derives its strength not so much from its rich land as from its free institutions. For the same reason I believe that time is bound to be on the side of the free world. The one element without which all power eventually defeats itself is the vitality of free men. Of this element of strength, the free world enjoys a complete and unchallenged monopoly.

We have the opportunity to mobilize this unfailing power, shared with free men everywhere, to mobilize on behalf of a just and lasting peace.

Not by what we say here, but by what we say and do after we leave this room.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 382.

U.S.S.R. Offers Nothing New on Korea

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 2

The Soviet representative has admitted that the Soviet Union has been assisting the Chinese Communist forces. They are, therefore, assisting those whom the United Nations has branded as aggressors, those who have been found guilty by the Security Council and by the General Assembly. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, the Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950, and the General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951, as regards the Chinese Communists. In all the utterances which the Soviet delegate made considering the matter of aggression, he talked all around the subject but he did not get to the heart of the matter, which was the early report by the United Nations Commission on Korea. That Commission consisted of India, as Chairman, Australia, China, El Salvador, France, the Philippines, and Turkey, which clearly and finally found that North Korea had launched the attack. I quote from the report; it is a brief quotation:

The invasion launched by the North Korean forces on June 25 cannot have been the result of a decision taken suddenly in order to repel a mere border attack or in retaliation for such an attack. Such an invasion involv-

¹ Made before Committee I (Political and Security) on Mar. 2. For Ambassador Lodge's initial statement on Korea, challenging Andrei Vyshinsky to deny charges of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists and North Koreans, see BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 382.

ing amphibious landings and the use of considerable numbers of troops carefully trained for aggressive action, and in relation to the area of great quantities of weapons and other war material presupposes a long premeditated, well-prepared and well-timed plan of aggression. The subsequent steady advance of the North Korean forces supplies further evidence, if further evidence is needed, of the extensive nature of the planning and preparation for the aggression. It is the considered opinion of the Commission that this planning and preparation was deliberate and an essential part of the policy of the North Korean authorities. The objective of this policy was to secure by force what could not be attained by any other means. In furtherance of this policy, the North Korean authorities on June 25, 1950, initiated a war of aggression without provocation and without warning.

Mr. Chairman, those are not the words of the United States. Those are the words of the U.N. Commission which was composed of the nations whose names I have just read.

I think that clears up pretty well the question of who is the aggressor, a question which has been decided by this organization on several occasions.

Then the Soviet representative accused the United States of wanting to continue the Korean

Soviet Assistance to Chinese Communists

The following is an excerpt from the verbatim text (U.N. doc. US/A/C.1/2552 dated Mar. 2, 1953, pp. 46 and 49-50) of Soviet delegate Andrei Vyshinsky's remarks before Committee I on March 2:

. . . He [Mr. Lodge] did not say anything new when he said that the U.S.S.R. was selling armaments to China. . . .

The Soviet Union has never concealed the fact that it sold and continues to sell armaments to its ally, China. As is well known, the Soviet Union concluded with China in 1945, even before the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic had come to power, a treaty of friendship and alliance. That treaty was confirmed in 1950 in a new treaty with the new Government of China. It was a treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance, concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's Republic. In line with these treaties the Soviet Union has sold and continues to sell armaments to China, while China sells to the Soviet Union various types of raw materials, including strategic raw materials; and this is quite natural. . . .

We do sell weapons and we have sold weapons to our friend and ally, the Chinese People's Republic; of course we do and of course we did. There was a treaty to that effect concluded as early as 1945 and re-concluded in 1950. We never concealed that. It is on the record and is an open book. . . .

action, of rejecting his so-called peace proposals. He referred to my quotation from the speech of Chou En Lai and, as he read the text of Chou En Lai's statement of February 4, he probably unwittingly read the statement from Chou En Lai that I had quoted, so I think that that statement can stand as quite accurate.

The Soviet representative says now, as he has

said before, let us have a cease-fire and talk about prisoners of war later. He said everybody who wants to end the Korean war hold up their hands. Nobody holds their hands up so, therefore, everybody except him favors a continuation of the war. You saw that.

Of course, his proposal, the proposal which the Soviet representative made at the first part of the session as part of the Soviet resolution, also set up a commission to consider the prisoner question and other political questions in such a way that the Soviet camp would in effect have a veto. You will recall that he called for a commission of 11 states of whom 4 would be Communists, and insisted that there be a two-thirds vote to reach a decision. You can remember that, and you can figure what is two-thirds of 11. The Soviet delegate doesn't have to be a clever mathematician to figure that out and we have figured it out, too.

The Soviet representative talks about a cease-fire now—have a cease-fire now and leave the question of prisoners to be decided later. It reminds me of the Communist willingness to have a cease-fire after their forces had overrun most of the territory of the Republic of Korea during the early days of their aggression. They knew then, as they know now, that there could be no cease-fire which leaves the fruits of aggression in their hands, or which is otherwise inconsistent with the principles for which we are fighting. Even if we took them at their word and assumed that they would in fact agree to a cease-fire now, what would it mean? As the Australian Ambassador so eloquently pointed out, it would be a cease-fire on condition that we leave in Communist hands thousands of United Nations and Republic of Korea soldiers as hostages; that we allow them to hold these hostages indefinitely; that we give the Communists the opportunity to use these hostages to blackmail the United Nations into agreeing to return the Communists by force—tens of thousands of prisoners who would violently resist efforts to return them to the fate which awaits them at the Communists' hands. And while they held these hostages and bargained over their fate, the Communists would be building up their airfields and maintaining a constant threat that if the prisoner question is not settled to their satisfaction they might start their aggression over again.

No, Mr. Chairman, no country participating in the fighting in Korea wants to abandon its prisoners and leave them as hostages. If Russian soldiers were involved, we do not believe the Soviet delegate would want to abandon them. But it is they and not we who have Asian soldiers as cannon fodder. I quote what the Soviet delegate said. They have Asian soldiers as cannon fodder and not we. And, of course, they are indifferent as to what happens to them.

The United States in the United Nations

[February 24–March 5]

General Assembly

The second part of the seventh session was opened on February 24 by General Assembly President Lester Pearson, who read a message of welcome from President Eisenhower¹ and then made a short statement urging that remaining items be considered in an expeditious manner. Since Committee I was the only main committee which had items remaining on its agenda, Mr. Pearson said that meetings would be scheduled only for this Committee unless budgetary questions came up which required the convening of Committee V.

He noted that the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities had replied to his message of December 5² and proposed that his report containing these replies be considered the starting point for resumed discussions on the Korean item. The item on personnel policy will be taken up in plenary at a later date.

Committee I (Political and Security)—The Committee on February 25 resumed the debate on the Korean question which was suspended on December 2, 1952, pending President Pearson's report on the replies to the proposals for settling the prisoner-of-war issue.

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (U.S.) declared that the "somber truth" was that the U.S.S.R. was "actively assisting the aggressors in Korea on a scale which makes possible the continuance of that aggression and determines its scope." The world should face the facts of the situation, he said, citing evidence that war equipment and planes had been supplied by the U.S.S.R. to the Chinese Communists fighting in Korea. He challenged the Soviet representatives to disprove these facts and declared: "The rulers of the Soviet Union can stop the war whenever they want to—and Mr. Vyshinsky knows it."³

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 382.

² For text of the message and excerpts from the Chinese Communists' reply, see *ibid.*, Jan. 12, 1953, p. 74. Text of the North Korean reply appears on p. 422 of this issue. For text of the resolution adopted on Dec. 3, 1952, containing proposals for settling the prisoner-of-war issue, see *ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1952, p. 916.

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 9, 1953, p. 383.

Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) said he accepted Mr. Lodge's challenge and would answer fully the points raised. He insisted, however, as he had at the first part of the session, that any serious debate of the Korean question would be impossible without the presence of representatives of North Korea. He again introduced a motion for an invitation to the representatives of North Korea to attend the Committee's discussion. During the subsequent discussion, Ambassador Lodge pointed out that the North Koreans had no status in the United Nations; that if they wanted peace, they had only to resume negotiations at Panmunjom and accept the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 3.

The Soviet motion was rejected by a vote of 16 in favor to 35 against, with 6 abstentions.

In addition to the original Korean item, "Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" (UNCURK), Committee I now has before it the item, "Reports of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction" (UNKRA), which has been re-allocated from Committee II (Economic and Financial). On a motion by the Colombian delegate, it was decided at the beginning of the February 25 meeting to discuss the UNKRA reports simultaneously with the UNCURK reports.

In addition to the Korean question, the other agenda items, listed in the order in which the Committee voted to discuss them, are—

Repatriation of members of the Greek armed forces;

Report of the Collective Measures Committee;

Interference of the United States in the internal affairs of other states (item introduced by Czechoslovakia);

Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and measures to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations (item introduced by Poland);

Question of impartial investigation of charges of use by U.N. forces of bacteriological warfare (item introduced by the United States).

Chairman João Carlos Muniz (Brazil) noted that the Committee still had three draft resolutions on Korea before it: the 21-nation draft

resolution⁴ and the drafts introduced by Mexico and Peru. Also before the Committee was President Pearson's report on the Communist response to the resolution adopted at the first part of the session.

On March 2 Andrei Vyshinsky replied to Ambassador Lodge's charges of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists and North Koreans. He told the Committee in the course of a 90-minute statement that the Soviet Union had never attempted to conceal the sale of armaments to its Chinese "ally." In an immediate rebuttal, Mr. Lodge pointed up this admission that the U. S. S. R. was aiding those judged by the United Nations to be guilty of aggression. (See p. 419.)

On March 4 Poland accused the United States of using the Indian resolution as an umbrella for "even more feverish attempts" to extend the war, exterminate the Korean people, and terrorize the Far East. Renewing charges of mistreatment of prisoners of war and use of germ warfare, the Polish representative also alleged increasing U. S. pressure on other countries to supply "cannon fodder."

Ambassador Lodge observed that the Polish speech did not justify reconsideration of the Indian resolution. The renewed bacteriological warfare charges would be dealt with under the appropriate item, he said, adding that the United States strongly favored investigation of these charges by an impartial commission. Recalling that the U. S. S. R. had vetoed a proposal for such a commission when his Government had introduced it in the Security Council, he questioned the usefulness of making charges and refusing honest efforts to have them investigated. "Bad faith" was the only term for such a practice.

Mr. Lodge noted that the Communist bloc spoke of peace but what they wanted was peace for themselves and war for others. The "cannon fodder" in the Korean fighting was not to be found on the U. N. side.

Technical Assistance Conference

The third Technical Assistance Conference took place at U.N. Headquarters on February 26-27. During the meetings, 64 Governments pledged \$20,863,575 toward the expanded program's goal of \$25,000,000. Many of these offers represented increases over contributions for earlier years. Ambassador Lodge confirmed the U.S. pledge of a maximum of \$14,708,750, with the proviso that the U.S. pledge would not exceed 60 percent of total pledges and subject to congressional appropriation of funds.⁵ At 60 percent of the total pledges made during the conference, the U.S. pledge amounts to \$12,518,145. Technical Assistance Administrator David Owen said three more

countries were considering contributions, which he hoped would bring the final total to within \$4,000,000 of the target figure. The final act of the conference remains open for signature until April 1, 1953.

North Koreans' Reply to U.N. Resolution on Prisoner Issue

Telegram dated December 17, 1952, addressed to the President of the General Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea

[Original: Russian]

U.N. doc. A/2354
Dated December 20, 1952

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the telegram dispatched by you concerning the adoption at the 399th plenary meeting of the seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations of the so-called draft resolution on the Korean question of 3 December 1952 in connexion with item 16 of the agenda. In this connexion I am empowered to state that the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea considers that not only does the above-mentioned draft resolution lack the legal basis which a genuine draft resolution on the solution of the Korean question must have but is also an unjust decision resulting from the hypocritical policy of the U.S.A. which is aiming at intrigues behind the scenes designed to secure a further continuation and expansion of the criminal and aggressive war in Korea. The resolution is therefore absolutely powerless to bring about an immediate end of the criminal and aggressive war which the United States is waging in Korea and a peaceful and just settlement of the Korean question. The Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, acting in accordance with the peaceful desires and insistent demands of the Korean people and of peace loving peoples throughout the world who have raised their voice against war and in defense of peace considers this draft resolution to be unacceptable.

On the instructions of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea a statement was sent by me on 17 October to the effect that the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea requests that the interested party—the legal representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea—be given an opportunity of participating in the discussion of the Korean question at the General Assembly and at the same time stating that it will regard as illegal any discussion and any decision taken without the participation of its representatives. It is an elementary truth to every educated person of today that the grant to the interested parties and legal representatives of an opportunity to express the views of their people at an international conference at which the fate of interested states and peoples is being discussed is not only a basic prerequisite for a just solution of the question but is a principle which is fundamental to international conferences claiming to defend freedom and democracy. The so-called majority group in the United Nations, acting upon instructions of the ruling circles of the United States has nevertheless declined to permit our legal representatives and the representatives of the Chinese People's Republic an opportunity to participate in the discussion of the Korean question, despite the just request of our government and has invited only representatives of the puppet regime of Syngman Rhee, who have absolutely no legal right to represent the Korean people and are an object of hatred to the entire Korean people.

What is the explanation for the fact that the majority

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 3, 1952, p. 680.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Mar. 9, 1953, p. 385.

group in the United Nations, obedient to the dictates of the United States, declined to admit representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to the General Assembly despite the fact that the presence of both interested parties is essential to a just solution of the Korean question? The explanation is first, that the majority group in the United Nations is not interested in a just solution of the Korean question; second, this group fears that representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea will expose the crimes committed by the Americans in Korea under the United Nations flag. In those circumstances the draft resolution on the Korean question manufactured behind the scenes in the United Nations by means of American dollars not only has no legal force but is an unprecedented document in that it constitutes a crime against the moral principles and conscience of mankind; I therefore protest against this illegal draft resolution fabricated on the instructions of the United States in order to deceive public opinion and all people of goodwill throughout the world. The decision you have adopted cannot be accepted by our government from the standpoint of a solution of the question of the repatriation of the prisoners of war. Contrary to established international standards and despite the existing principles clearly laid down in the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, the decision taken by you is based on the principle of so-called voluntary repatriation dictated by the Americans. This unprecedented demand, as the whole world now knows, in fact signifies the use of force and the exertion of pressure on our country's patriots now in captivity. It means compulsory "screening" and "interrogation" by the use of severe repressive measures, even the mass shooting of unarmed men. The purpose of this inhuman principle is merely to retain a large proportion of the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war on their side by any method. Such a principle corresponds to the aggressive purposes and intentions of the United States and its satellites which are aiming at ending the Korean war not by peaceful means but by a military decision. It is time it was realized that no deception and no military threat on the part of the United States military speculators can ever intimidate or subjugate the Korean people, which knows full well that it is fighting for its freedom and independence. If the United Nations really intends to do everything possible to achieve the rapid conclusion of the war in Korea, as emphasized in your cablegram, this should not be merely a good intention (? of no practical value) but a real effort must be made to achieve a genuinely just solution of the Korean question and, above all, to secure an immediate cease-fire in Korea.

In view of the foregoing I request you, as President of the present session of the General Assembly, to take the following appropriate steps forthwith: 1. To revoke the above-mentioned "resolution" illegally adopted by the General Assembly to camouflage the aggressive United States policy of prolonging and extending the Korean war; 2. To condemn the fighting in Korea and to take the necessary steps to bring about an immediate cease-fire in Korea and achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the U.S.S.R. proposals of 10 and 24 November 1952 which are wholeheartedly supported and approved by all peace-loving nations; 3. To give representatives of the PDRK [People's Democratic Republic of Korea] an opportunity to participate in the discussion on the Korean question in the organs of the United Nations, as the true representatives of the Korean people; 4. To call to account the representatives of the American side who are responsible for the breakdown of the Panmunjom negotiations, having unilaterally broken off indefinitely

the truce negotiations in Korea which had succeeded in settling the fundamental issues except for the sole remaining question of prisoners of war; 5. To put an end to the barbarous bombing of the peaceful populations, towns and villages of North Korea by the American aggressors under the flag of the United Nations; 6. To cease immediately the barbarous procedure of forcibly detaining our prisoners of war and the inhuman treatment and mass murder of and brutality towards the inmates of prisoner-of-war camps; 7. In accordance with international law and the conscience of mankind, to punish severely the American war criminals who, hypocritically trampling upon the standards of international law and the principles of human morality, are using bacterial, chemical and other weapons for the mass slaughter of the peaceful inhabitants of North Korea, so that a repetition of such barbarous crimes may be impossible in the future. If these just proposals which accord with the aspirations of the Korean people and of all peace-loving nations are rejected by the (majority) group in the United Nations, may the entire responsibility for the continuation of the war in Korea rest with those members of the United Nations which overtly or covertly are supporting the United States aggression in Korea.

I have the honour, Mr. President, to request you to make this statement known to all members of the United Nations.

I have the honour to be, etc.

PAKH HEN EN
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PDRK
[People's Democratic Republic of Korea]

THE DEPARTMENT

Statement by Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs

Press release 122 dated March 3

The following statement was made by Robert W. S. McLeod on March 3, after he was sworn in as administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

This is a very complex job and the area of responsibility is extremely wide. While I have some definite personal convictions, I have no preconceived conclusions regarding the task which confronts me. I plan to proceed in a calm, orderly way in accordance with the policies of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. I would much rather tell the press what I have done than what I plan to do.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on March 2 confirmed Mrs. Clare Booth Luce as Ambassador to Italy.

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